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This paper adapts Zigurs & Buckland’s (1998) Task Technology Fit theoretical 
framework for application to a virtual organization that exists for episodically during foreign 
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts. Using the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, and more than 1000 lessons learned cases from the federal government, I 
examine how task activities, process support level, military command level and partner types 
influence the technology platform that is used for structured and unstructured data sharing in real 
time. The predicted fit between task and technology is supported; however, addition of 
consideration of the virtual nature of the internal and external partnerships that are required for 
foreign disaster relief efforts improves the explanatory model. Recommendations for theory 






In a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) response to a natural or man-made 
disaster, information is critical to anyone who, or any organization that, has to determine, plan 
and execute courses of action. Add to this the fact that these types of operations involve many 
diverse organizations that must work together towards a common goal of providing relief, the 
sharing and exchange of information becomes a priority for a successful, coordinated operation. 
The international aspect in foreign disaster relief efforts creates another layer of complexity 
regarding the nature of data that will be shared by the U.S. military with national and 
international partners. 
This research explores the following question: “In international HA/DR efforts, what 
kinds of information are shared with and between diverse partners and the U.S. military?” 
Through empirical analysis, I seek to understand the extent to which different tasks influence the 
utilization of different technology formats. Is there a reliance on data that are unstructured, such 
as that found in social media? Or, does the U.S. military prefer to share more traditional 
structured data, such as lists and databases? The type of data that are shared in unplanned 
emergencies can influence the success of the collaboration necessary for the planning and 
execution of a disaster relief operation by many diverse organizations working together toward a 
common goal of humanitarian assistance. 
Background on Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Efforts 
Disasters can be natural or man-made. Examples of natural disasters would include 
hurricanes, cyclones, mudslides, wild fires, tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanoes, and so on. These 
occur around the world, many times with little warning. These disasters vary in magnitude from 
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simple property damage to extensive property damage and loss of lives. Sometimes disasters are 
so devastating that countries have to reach out to other countries for assistance. Time is critical 
for all relief efforts and so is the coordination and collaboration among all the organizations and 
people from around the world who participate. Information sharing across a variety of 
technology platforms is paramount to achieving this goal. 
The primary job of the U.S. military is not responding to domestic or foreign disaster 
events. The primary job of the U.S. military is national defense. It is only on occasion that the 
U.S. military will be asked to assist in an HA/DR operation. The reason for an assistance request 
from a foreign country is typically because units of the U.S. military are stationed around the 
world. Further the U.S. military has the ability to re-act quickly and has the resources to jump 
start a disaster relief operation. In anticipation of these kinds of assistance requests, the U.S. 
military conducts many disaster response scenario training exercises each year around the world. 
The geographic location of the training exercise defines the type of disaster upon which the 
training exercise will focus, the military personnel and equipment which will be involved, and 
the local partners, military and non-military, invited to participate in the training exercise. 
Even though the U.S. military is the organization that is asked for assistance, the lead 
federal agency for any disaster response effort in which federal organizations will play a role is 
the U.S. Department of State. This organization works closely with United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to coordinate the response of multiple federal 
organizations. The U.S. military has high visibility in these types of operations. Foreign disaster 
response efforts are good public relations for the United States, U.S. government organizations, 
and the U.S. military. It is also very rewarding to U.S. military personnel to provide this type of 
support, to save lives and provide relief to those affected by a disaster. 
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There are two distinct types of HA/DR responses in which the U.S. military can be 
involved: domestic and international. Domestic Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief refers 
to a response by United States-based organizations in response to disasters that occur within the 
fifty United States (primarily a National Guard responsibility). For domestic natural or man-
made disaster events, there are established processes, procedures, and resources at the local, state 
and national levels. Generally, the resources drawn from multiple levels of government are 
sufficient for the disaster response and requests for assistance from other countries are not 
usually made. For this reason, I have limited my analysis to foreign HA/DR events since these 
are emergency disaster situations where another country, or countries, have asked for assistance 
from the U.S. military since the disaster response efforts will require resources that exceed the 
country’s capacity. 
When requests for the U.S. military to be involved in foreign HA/DR events are received, 
the procedures for deciding if the U.S. military will be involved and to what extent, is well 
defined; however, there is no way to anticipate in advance of a disaster with whom the U.S. 
military will be partnering. Further, there are differences in levels of resources and disaster 
planning and training for countries around the world. This means that the responses for some 
HA/DR events will benefit from joint planning exercises that had previously been conducted 
with the U.S. military, while other countries will not be as familiar with the different command 
levels and the nuances in expectations for what will be provided by each level and at what phase 
in the disaster response. Further, there could be a lack of knowledge of preferred strategic, 
tactical and operational processes embedded in the military’s scenario training exercises. The 
individual and joint influence of all of these factors for HA/DR events is a topic that has not 




As described above, in foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster response efforts, the U.S. 
military is likely to have conducted training exercises to practice responses for common tasks 
necessary in different phases of a multiplicity of disaster events. As part of the scenario based 
military exercises, protocols for data sharing across different technological platforms have been 
developed. Based on the presence of predictable routine tasks in a HA/DR event, which are 
similar to routine tasks in corporations, this research uses the theoretical lens of task-technology 
fit (TTF) theory (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998) for analyzing how the U.S. military shares data 
with a wide variety of partners in an international HA/DR response. 
Task technology fit theory suggests that there are five generic types of tasks performed in 
an organization. These five tasks as considered along three technological dimensions. The theory 
predicts that information technology can improve individual, and thus organizational, 
performance (Goodhue and Thompson, 1995). These findings were extended in 1998, to 
examine group performance rather than individual performance. Testing the revised theory, the 
results demonstrated similar increases in performance when tasks and technology are aligned 
Zigurs and Buckland, (1998). This extension of TTF theory to group performance can be 
considered to be analogous to the U.S. military disaster response since multiple actors with a 
variety of task responsibilities but a single event and outcome focus are present. 
Assuring that the right information is available to all members of a group at the right time 
is an important conclusion from TTF theory. This conclusion can be extrapolated to foreign 
disaster responses that are successfully accomplished by gathering, aggregating, evaluating and 
structuring both structured and unstructured data. Achieve this in a foreign disaster response is a 
difficult and complex activity since physical infrastructure may have been destroyed or will not 
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be reliable. Further, HA/DR is not a unitary task since it is an open network of collaborators 
representing government, for profit and non-governmental organizations from many countries, 
yet the specific who cannot be identified prior to the disaster. This operational context translates 
to a situation featuring many different partners contributing and/or accessing data throughout all 
the disaster response tasks. 
In this dissertation, I modify the task-technology framework to test its transferability to a 
governmental setting, and in particular, one that simultaneously feature routine and predictable 
tasks activities that have to be modified based on an unplanned disaster context. The focus of this 
analysis is solution scheme multiplicity (Zigurs and Buckland, 1998, p. 317) and the choice of 
the communication technologies. Further, the concept of a group is extended to a virtual group of 
partners representing organizations that are external to the U.S. military organizations. In 
addition to deductively testing the two variables (task and technology) in the model proposed by 
Zigurs and Buckland (1998), I inductively analyze three other variables (process level, military 
command and the kinds of partners) that my personal experiences suggest could be additional or 
stronger predictors of the choice of data types hosted in different technology platforms to be 
shared between the U.S. military and ad hoc disaster relief partners. 
Using case studies of two high visibility foreign HA/DR operations, both of which 
involved the United States military playing a major role in the provision of disaster relief, this 
dissertation examines factors that might influence information sharing choices during the relief 
efforts. The results from the case studies are compared to more than 1,000 lessons learned cases 
developed for, and maintained by, the U.S. federal government to systematically analyze military 
and non-military activities to improve future disaster relief response operations. 
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Case #1: Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 
One of the most devastating disasters in our life time was the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 
2004, which was centered off the coast of Indonesia but had devastating affects throughout the 
entire region and even as far away as the African continent. The death toll would eventually 
reach nearly a quarter million people. A massive 9.0 magnitude earthquake off the coast of 
Sumatra, Indonesia, had generated a huge tsunami that affected not only the immediate area in a 
matter of minutes but also had effects across the entire region, traveling at over 500 miles an 
hour and affecting countries across three continents. 
For this relief effort, the Combined Support Force 536 was established and was made up 
of militaries from 15 countries from the region and around the world, along with both 
governmental and non-governmental relief agencies as well as regional and international 
organizations (Dorsett 2005). These many and varied organizations were all part of a combined 
support force to provide assistance and relief to those who were affected. The disaster and the 
relief effort that followed is of great interest not only because of the magnitude of the disaster, 
the huge geographic expanse, and the amount of human suffering, but also because of the 
worldwide response. This was a real-world event that would validate the need for information 
sharing across a wide range of organizations and would shape how countries responded in 
subsequent disasters. The U.S. military’s Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific Area Network 
(APAN) was one of the primary sources for information sharing in the disaster response. The 
network facilitated the coordination and collaboration among all non-traditional security partners 
who were key to the success of this enormous international relief effort. The centrality of the 
network is important to note because the APAN network would also be used for the same 
purpose after the Haiti earthquake five years later and a half a world away. 
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Case #2: Haiti Earthquake in 2010 
The second case to be examined is one of the most notable examples of humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief events requiring information sharing to achieve an efficient and 
coordinated response in a multinational disaster relief effort. This is the 7.0 magnitude 
earthquake which rocked the island nation of Haiti in January 2010. The loss of life and property 
was significant but limited to one country and the devastating effects were immediately known. 
Both of these events, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 and the Haiti earthquake in 2010, were 
similar in many other ways. In both events, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief was 
required by the affected country. Both cases involved a natural disaster of an earthquake that was 
started without warning. Also, in both events, the responders were non-governmental 
organizations; federal agencies from around the world; militaries with specialized equipment, 
manpower and resources, civil authorities; and local organizations. 
Comparative Cases: Joint Lessons Learned Data Base 
The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is a knowledge management 
system designed to allow federal government stakeholders to document observations and 
described best practices identified as valuable information that provides lessons learned from 
crisis and steady state operations, events, and exercises. The lessons learned in the database often 
serve as the basis to bolster, and in some cases, establish capability requirements when the 
analysis suggests capability gaps. The title “Joint Lessons Learned Information System” suggests 
that it is available to only the various joint organizations and combatant commands, when it in 
fact includes lessons learned from all service commands and component commands - essentially 
all military organizations. Another factor that makes JLLIS a valuable resource is that it also 
includes entries by interagency organizations that interface with the military as well. Even 
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though this system is primarily for military and government organizations, many of the 
contributions include working with external and international partners. 
Chapter Summary 
The pace of natural and man-made disasters seems to be accelerating. Combined with 
this, the magnitude of the disaster often exceeds a single country’s resources for responding to a 
disaster. Requests for the assistance of the United States government, and in particular the U.S. 
military, are not unusual. In anticipation of these requests, the U.S. military conducts training 
exercises (alone and with international partners) for responding to a wide variety of disaster 
scenarios. The training reflects the reality that, when disaster strikes, the U.S. military will be 
partnering with a wide variety of national and international organizations during the various 
phases of a disaster response for a collaborative Humanitarian Disaster/Disaster Relief response. 
Using two HA/DR cases that involved the U.S. military combined with over 1000 federal 
lessons learned cases with topics related to information sharing, this dissertation extends Zigurs 
and Buckland’s (1998) task and technology fit theory to the context of data sharing technology 
platforms that are used for foreign disaster response tasks the U.S. military performs, often in 
collaboration with internal and external partners. Three types of data are considered: structured, 
unstructured, and mixed. Structured data is defined as data that is organized in a pre-defined 
manner, much like databases and spreadsheets. By comparison, unstructured data are data that 
are not organized in a pre-defined manner, but rather lend themselves to free form technologies 
such as social media. Mixed is used to describe information that is shared simultaneously 
through the sharing of both structured and unstructured data. The reason for examining the type 
of data and technology platforms to be used for information sharing during foreign humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief efforts is that the U.S. military tends to prefer a structured data 
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approach for sharing information since it offers more control in real time. Yet, for the multiple 
members of a HA/DR group (some of whom are familiar to the U.S. military and many others 
who are not) to function as a cohesive unit, there are moments when unstructured data are 
needed to complement the sharing of structured data. Determining the best way to make 
information available to those who need it and how to coordinate communications during 
different response phases is critical to the overall success of the disaster relief efforts. 
This research examines the unique collaborations during episodic and contextually 
nuanced HA/DR events as they relate to prescriptions drawn from the literature about task-
technology fit. Three questions guide the analysis. The first two questions are answered through 
deductive inquiry. The last question explores the robustness of my adaptation of Task 
Technology Fit theory through an inductive analysis of four competing independent variables. 
Research Question #1: What are the types of data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR 
events? 
Research Question #2: What is the relative fit between the Task variable and the types of 
data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
Research Question #3: Are there other factors, such as Process Support Level, Military 
Command and/or Partners, that provide a more robust explanation of the types of data shared 
during the activities of the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
The dependent variable underlying each of the research questions is the type of data 
being shared. The independent variables that are examined are: (disaster response) phase, process 
support level, military command, and partners. In addition, there is a single control variable to 
differentiate between each of the two case studies and the JLLIS lessons learned cases. 
Combined, these variables address the five W’s, who, what, when, where and why. 
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Who refers to the Partner variable: The partners with whom the U.S. military shares 
information. 
What refers to the Military Command: The command function tasked with supporting 
different tasks during the relief operation. 
When is used to describe the Phase: The tasks normally performed during each of six 
phases of the relief operation including pre and post-activities. 
Where is the institutional location of the Partners: The internal (traditional) and external 
(non-traditional) organizations with whom the U.S. military partners in each specific HA/DR 
case. 
Why described the Process Support Level: The type of support, strategic, tactical or 
operational, that guides specific foreign disaster relief responses provided by the U.S. military. 
The next chapter provides a description of the U.S. military and the nature of their 
involvement in foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief efforts. In addition, scholarly 
literature that provides the theoretical framework related to task and technology fit (TTF) is 
reviewed. The chapter also elaborates the manner in which the TTF theoretical framework is 
adapted for application to the tasks and data sharing technologies the U.S. military has used and 





The research focus for this study is on the fit between the task and the use of technology 
for communication between multiple and diverse partners in foreign humanitarian 
assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) efforts by the U.S. military. Effectively communicating in 
a natural disaster is challenging because the data must be provided in a way that allows for 
integration from multiple sources and fosters transparency and accessibility. In addition, since 
the location and nature of the disaster are different in every situation, the types of partners who 
are involved in the response vary greatly. This research examines the sharing of data across 
different kinds of tasks in a context featuring situation-specific collaborations necessary for 
unpredictable HA/DR events using an adapted task-technology fit theoretical framework. 
The first section of this chapter describes typical tasks and data sharing technology 
platforms used by the U.S. military in foreign HA/DR activities. Following that description, the 
second section elaborates the characteristics of four specific factors that may influence the data 
sharing technology choices of the U.S. military during a foreign disaster response. In the third 
section, the theoretical framework guiding the analysis are introduced. This is followed by a 
discussion of how the theory is adapted to apply to the U.S. military HA/DR response efforts in 
the fourth section. The final section of this chapter re-states the research questions and presents 
the expectations for the empirical analysis. 
The U.S. Military Role in HA/DR Events 
In many countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), International Organizations 
(IOs), and other groups structure their on-going operations and have resources readily available 
to provide assistance to vulnerable communities around the world. Many times, these 
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organizations are already in place in the geographic areas impacted by natural and man-made 
disasters. Whether or not in the geographical area of the disaster, these organizations are usually 
the first with “boots on the ground” immediately following a disaster. For this reason, the 
organizations play a very valuable role in providing the initial relief response, especially in 
countries that do not have slack resources available for disaster relief efforts. These resources 
include medical supplies, food, shelter, and manpower resources. Military resources may also be 
necessary for transporting people, equipment and supplies to the disaster ravaged area. In 
addition, military members from the impacted country and from other countries often provide 
public safety and security services until civil order is restored. 
In a complex foreign humanitarian assistance relief effort, there are many players 
involved. There are relief agencies, non-governmental and international organizations, in-country 
and foreign government organization, and possibly foreign and domestic militaries. Each of these 
organizational entities offer unique and some not so unique specialties and can play a diversity of 
roles in the disaster response. These organizations have information that could be valuable to all 
the other organizations, allowing for the leveraging of unique capabilities and strengths. 
Efficiency in data sharing and collaborative relief response efforts are so critical in a coordinated 
relief effort. Achieving could be as simple as sharing data on hospital capacity in an affected 
area, providing satellite imagery or information on supply routes to create a shared operational 
picture, etc.  
Information that is to be shared will differ based on partner capabilities and the intended 
level of use. For example, if an organization is addressing first responder needs, some of the 
information they might share would be considered at the tactical level, such as a readily available 
low-band width technology solution such as a tweet or text message, providing location and 
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details of the real time situation. While other organizations may be involved only at the 
operational level where number of pallets of water, medical supplies, bridges and supply route 
conditions, infrastructure needs, air field and port capabilities, hospital capabilities and the like 
would be their focus. This information will allow responders to execute the operation so that the 
necessary transportation and/or delivery systems can be provided in order to get these resources 
to where they are needed. Generic planning for the disaster response tasks and identification of 
information that can be shared, how it will be shared and with whom, in advance of a disaster is 
illustrative of data sharing considerations at the strategic level. 
It is important to understand processes behind how information is shared and how 
coordination is conducted between disparate organizations who are thrown together by a disaster. 
The context of the situation where the disaster has occurred establishes the required activities for 
the response, which then drives the solutions that can be offered by the various partner 
organizations engaged in the disaster response effort. To make this process happen in the 
sequence that is necessary, information sharing plays a big part and therefore, communications 
systems that can be adapted for operations outside the U.S. military domains are vital. 
The United Nations High Commission (UNHCR) for Refugees understands the 
importance of information sharing. They have a handbook entitled: “A UNHCR Handbook for 
the Military on Humanitarian Operations.” This handbook addresses the importance of sharing 
information with the military (UNHCR, 1995). The U.S. Department of Defense also values 
information sharing as confirmed by a publication entitled the Department of Defense 
Information Sharing Implementation Plan (DOD, 2016) that “identifies tasks to drive cultural 
transformation as needed to better promote the practice of information sharing” (p. ii). The 
importance of pre-established data sharing protocols is suggested by the first case study, the 
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Indian Ocean Tsunami Relief Effort in 2004 (called OPERATION UNIFIED ASSISTANCE). 
Recall that I mentioned in Chapter one that there were 15 foreign militaries that participated in 
the relief effort, along with all the non-governmental organizations, international organizations, 
local and regional groups and ad hoc groups of residents. 
The technology used to exchange information and accomplish disaster relief tasks in a 
collaborative environment can vary. The information can be shared in numerous ways such as 
spreadsheets, lists, databases, and files with delimited data. Various technology platforms, such 
as database management systems, spreadsheet applications, and document management systems 
are used to support these means of capturing, organizing and exchanging data. There are other 
technologies and technology platforms that support the sharing of data that is more unstructured 
such as blogs, wikis, forums, discussion boards, chat rooms, and other forms related to other 
technologies that support user-generated content, sometimes described as Web 2.0 technologies. 
There are a variety of factors identified in the literature and drawn from the author’s experience 
as a U.S. military member and participant in the two HA/DR events that constitute the cases in 
this research. Four of these factors are introduced in the next section. 
Factors that Influence Data Sharing Technology 
Based on experiences gleaned from historical disaster responses, training exercises and 
planning for future disaster responses, the U.S. military has already identified and documented 
important factors that can increase the likelihood of a successful HA/DR response. Four factors 
thought to be critical to foreign disaster reliefs efforts: Phases, Support Level, Military 




There are six phases outlined in the United States Pacific Command Foreign 
Humanitarian Operations Concept of Operations (2014, p. 19). Details from this document 
regarding the tasks and activities that should occur in each phase are provided below: 
• Phase 0 – Prepare. The military refers to this phase as shaping the environment. 
Denoted as Phase 0, these are activities that are not specific to a disaster that has 
already occurred. Instead they are in preparation for different kinds of disasters 
that can be expected to occur in the foreseeable future. Preparation for a response, 
but a currently unknown, crisis is accomplished through participating in 
collaborative endeavors such as conferences, training and exercises with other 
regional partners. Through these activities, regional security cooperation is 
enhanced which increases the capacity to respond in this type of environment. 
Identifying what type of information is shared and how to share that information 
during this phase is critical to the success of the subsequent phases. 
• Phase I – Assess. This phase is characterized by formalized crisis assessment to 
create a situational awareness of the emergency and to prepare to deploy 
resources in response to the needs that have been identified at the site of the 
disaster. Assessment and crisis action planning is done in this phase. Availability 
of critical information is key as is any information that would aid in the 
development of the assessment. 
• Phase II – Respond. This is the phase where support efforts begin to happen 
including the movement of forces and equipment to provide support as needed. In 
this phase where resources are deployed to the international disaster site, 
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information sharing among all participants, whether through the Multinational 
Command Center or otherwise, helps establish liaison support and 
interoperability. 
• Phase III – Execution. This phase is where mission support operations are 
conducted and ends for the military when USAID/OFDA no longer needs the 
military assistance. Information and information sharing needs to support these 
operations are provided in a variety of diverse ways depending on how an 
organization is supporting the mission. 
• Phase IV – Transition. Through planning and coordination with the Embassy 
within the affected country along with the USAID/OFDA, the military will 
transition their resources from the mission. Information sharing is key to the 
planning process to collaborate on the best way to transition the military mission. 
• Phase V – Redeployment. This phase reflects the return to home station for the 
forces deployed once the relief effort is completed. 
These six phases, especially Phases I through V, tend to overlap to some extent. For 
example, at the beginning of a disaster relief event, getting timely assessments to a planner are 
essential in order to provide to put together the resources necessary to respond to the crisis. 
These plans are necessary for the Response phase which follows. The type of information that is 
collected and shared must be both timely and add value in creating a what the U.S. military has 
termed a Common Operational Picture. As the operation progresses through these various 
phases, in many cases, assessments will be made to monitor the response and make updates to 
the Common Operational Picture that is shared with partners. 
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In preparation for disasters, organizations must collect information that is useful for 
guiding response efforts and available to members immediately when the natural disaster arises. 
For example, the U.S. military collects information on airfields, shipping ports, communications 
capabilities, frequency management requirements, hospitals and hospital capabilities, 
infrastructure, and power, to have planning information readily available during their planning. 
During the Execution phase of an HA/DR event, efficient information sharing becomes 
paramount. Every HA/DR is unique. Depending on the type and magnitude of the disaster, 
different organizations will engage whether they be government, non-governmental, or military 
organizations. Each organization needs access to an entire spectrum of information to plan and 
coordinate appropriately. Sharing this information also contributes to a collaborative approach 
when providing relief. These organizations also need a venue in which to share information with 
other organizations to get a clear idea of what is going on, or a common operational picture. In 
post relief efforts, there are many organizations that document lessons learned to suggest 
solutions to improve future HA/DR responses. These lessons learned cases are made widely 
available through JLLIS. 
Process Support Level 
There is an involved process of accessing the U.S. military’s resources in HA/DR efforts 
even though there are major combatant commands that have humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief as part of their defined missions. It even gets more complex when the relief effort is in a 
foreign country. The United States military cannot make a unilateral response. It must be vetted 
through the appropriate processes which includes coordination with the host country 
government, the U.S. Ambassador to that country, the Embassy, USAID and the State 
Department. It is only at that time that the U.S. military may be asked to assist and in what role. 
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Figure 2.1 taken from an operational level HA/DR briefing, provides an overview of the 
processes involved in requesting U.S. DOD support. 
 
Figure 2.1: Process Support Level 
When the U.S. military is asked to assist in a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
response, they operate at various levels. There are three levels of support defined for this study: 
strategic, operational, and tactical. Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz was a Prussian general 
and military theorist who is still studied today throughout military communities around the 
world. His theories were, of course related to war, but his ideas are also relevant to military-
operations-other-than-war (MOOTW), such as a humanitarian disaster relief operation. (von 
Clausewitz, 1989). Clausewitz provides an enduring framework from which militaries can build 
staffs as they plan, conduct and coordinate operations as efficiently as possible. The U.S. military 
has adopted this same framework in its literature and the standard operating procedures 
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document entitled, Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Multinational Force Standing 
Operating Procedure (MPAT MNF SOP), suggests that their expected efforts across different 
process support levels are no exception. Table 2.1 shows how von Clausewitz’s theories (1989) 
are still relevant when considering operations whether it be for war-time or other operations. 
Table 2.1 Process Support Levels– von Clausewitz and MNF SOP 
 
von Clausewitz MNF SOP 
Strategic The strategic level of war is concerned 
with the art and science of employing 
national power. 
Development and employment of 
national/multinational level 
resources; national interests at stake. 
Operational The operational level of war is 
concerned with the planning and 
conduct of campaigns. It is at this 
level that military strategy is 
implemented by assigning missions, 
tasks and resources to tactical 
operations. A controlled series of 
simultaneous or sequential operations 
designed to achieve an operational 
commander's objective, normally 
within a given time or space. See also 
operational level of war. 
Translate strategic objectives into 
tactical tasks via strategies 
campaigns, and major operations. 
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Tactical The tactical level of war is concerned 
with the planning and conduct of 
battle and is characterized by the 
application of concentrated force and 
offensive action to gain objectives. 
Employment of forces at the 
“execution (field) level” to execute 
approved military courses of action. 
In an HA/DR response, the U.S. military can be asked to provide support at any of these 
levels, sometimes it is multiple levels. Further, the levels of support can change as the operation 
transitions through the various phases. Therefore, the process support level for planning and 
execution where information is shared is a factor considered in this research. For example, if the 
organization is addressing first-responder needs, the information that is available may only be at 
the tactical level, such as a readily available low-bandwidth solution such as a tweet or text 
message, which could provide location and details of the real-time situation. While other 
organizations may be involved only at the operational or strategic level where the number of 
pallets of water, medical supplies, bridges and supply route conditions, infrastructure needs, 
airfield and port capabilities, hospital capabilities and the like, would be their focus. This 
information will allow responders to plan and execute the operation so that the necessary 
transportation and/or delivery systems can be provided to get these resources to where they are 
needed. Thus, the technology that is used may change based on the role the military in support of 
an HA/DR effort. 
Military Command 
The U.S. military has a complex organization chart with a multitude of levels that may 
have authority and/or responsibility for different foreign disaster response efforts. The 
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hierarchical structure of the organization chart of the U.S. military includes multiple boxes, that 
represent command functions, which provide either line or staff services to the military. 
Figure 2.2 from the Air War College shows what a Joint Organization Task Force might 
look like (http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/pub1/chapter_1.pdf). Pay particular attention to 
the number staffs, they are almost identical to the staffs defined in the MNF SOP with the 
exception of the Civil-Military Operations Staff. 
 
Figure 2.2 Joint Staff Organization 
Table 2.2 cross-walks this figure to allow comparison of these staffs that are defined in 
the MNF SOP, and as they are structured for the United States Joint Staff, and U.S. Agency for 




Table 2.2: Military Command Staffs 
 
Staff Function MNF SOP U.S. Joint Staff USAID FM 
Personnel C1 Personnel J1 Personnel J1 Administration 
Intelligence C2 Intelligence J2 Intelligence J2 Intelligence 
Operations C3 Operations J3 Operations J3 Operations 
Logistics C4 Logistics J4 Logistics J4 Logistics 
Plans and Policy C5 Plans and Policy J5 Plans and Policy J5 Plans and Policy 
Communications C6 Communications 
and Information 
Systems 




Note: In this table, the J-7 Joint Force Development Directorate and the J-8 Force Structure, 
Resources and Assessments, were not included primarily because there are no equivalents in 
either the MNF SOP, or the USAID Field Manual.   
 
This table shows how the structure of the task force defined in the MNF SOP is closely 
aligned with the how the Joint Staff is structured. You will also find similar structures in 
command staffs throughout the military. The other key point here is that USAID, a key inter-
agency player in all foreign disaster response efforts, has provided their staffs with information 
about what they should expect when working with the military at a disaster site in their field 
manual. This information provides USAID and other agencies who participate in the foreign 
disaster response with a basic understanding of the staff structures. Knowing this allows all 
partners to collaborate more effectively. 
Thinking specifically about an HA/DR event, there are six command functions that are 
executed prior to, during and after the disaster event. They include Personnel, Intelligence, 
Operations, Logistics, Plans, and Communications. Staffs in each of these commands are 
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critically important to the success of disaster relief efforts. Personnel working in each of the 
commands are usually trained within their specialty in order to provide the services and 
equipment required by the functional areas to which they are assigned. The technology they use 
to share information is also impacted by the function they are performing. 
The Personnel Command staff manages personnel and personnel administration, develops 
personnel policies, administers military and civilian personnel from all nations participating in 
the disaster response. Per Joint Publication 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, 
Personnel staff manages personnel and administration, develops personnel policies, administers 
military, and civilian personnel from all nations participating within the Combined Task Force 
(CTF). Here are some of the functions for which a Personnel staff would be responsible: 
Individual Augmentation Planning and Procedures 
Joint Reception Center and Joint Personnel Training and Tracking Activities 
Personnel Accountability and Strength Reporting Encompassing Military, 
Department of Defense, Civilians, Contractors, and Multinational Personnel 
Pay, Allowances, and Entitlements 
Postal Operations 
Morale, Welfare, and Recreation 
Casualty Rates and Reporting 
Awards and Decorations 
Performance Reporting and Tracking 
Civilian Personnel Management 




Noncombatant Evacuation and Repatriation Operations 
Personnel Recovery Considerations 
Personnel Support to Multinational Operations 
(Source: Joint Publication 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations) 
The Intelligence Command staff’s basic function is to ensure the availability of reliable 
intelligence and timely indications and warnings on the characteristics of the area of operations 
and the location and activities. One of the primary responsibilities of the Intelligence staff is to 
address joint, interagency, and multinational intelligence sharing and cooperation. During 
Operation Unified Assistance, the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) J2 Action Officer 
posted daily updates to APAN to ensure the entire staff and task force have timely updates and 
situational awareness. Usually intelligence information is protected meaning information is 
closely held and not shared. However, in a relief operation, commanders have more flexibility. 
The C-2 staff’s basic function is to ensure the availability of reliable intelligence and 
timely indications and warnings on the characteristics of the area of operations and the location 
and activities. When operating in a multi-national environment, the level of classification 
pertaining to national security interests and the appropriateness of releasing the information to 
other countries is paramount. For the most part intelligence information in a HA/DR effort will 
be unclassified and usually provided on a commercial network in order for it to be available to 
all countries who are participating in the relief effort. This kind of unfettered information access 
is valuable for situational awareness and planning. There are other networks that can be used 
when there are proprietary systems in place to ensure that the information on these technology 
platforms is protected, yet accessible to those who already have clearance. There are networks 
which are used by the intelligence community just for this purpose. There are also networks that 
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can be setup and deployed almost immediately if the disaster response is bi-lateral, and in some 
instances multi-lateral, where certain partner countries participate and for which the 
configuration of these networks are previously agreed upon through formal agreements. 
In the case of a multi-national response, a commercial network will give the disaster 
relief community of organizations the widest possible dissemination of information for planning 
and coordination of the effort. That is why APAN was the collaborative solution of choice in the 
two case studies. This information platform operates on a commercial network and the proof of 
concept has been demonstrated numerous times in multi-national exercises to simulate a 
multinational disaster response scenario. Intelligence staffs, who are used to working in a 
classified environment, are often challenged to adjust to an unclassified environment in order to 
perform their information gathering and dissemination responsibilities. The information they 
provide can be in various forms, such as maps providing situation awareness and a common 
picture of the operation, announcements of intelligence information as it is gathered, and so on. 
Intelligence personnel must also examine information for planning and analysis. 
The Operations Command staff assists the in the direction and control of activities that 
occur on the ground during the foreign disaster relief operations. the focus is responding to the 
crisis in a way that is synched up with other commands with who they are coordinating. This is 
done by implementing a “battle rhythm”, the term that the military uses to establish a daily 24-
hour schedule of events to coordinate, to plan and to execute as the operation unfolds. 
If there is one place that information is crucial, it within the Operations staff. Cross 
functional operational planning teams will be formed to address specific planning needs. These 
teams are composed of subject matter experts from across the staff. Throughout the MNF SOP, 
planning teams are called out based on the operation that is being undertaken. During Operation 
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Unified Assistance, APAN hosted daily update briefs that were used to discuss the current 
situation, discuss both current and future operations, and make decisions on the most appropriate 
courses of action. Databases were also hosted on APAN, that captured information to respond to 
Requests for Assistance. Thanks to these databases, with a click of a button information could be 
downloaded in a spreadsheet format allowing for easy sorting and prioritizing thus allowing 
planners to build their plans to meet operational goals. The battle rhythm usually features 
commander’s briefings, daily shift change briefings, and other functional areas as needed. 
The Logistics Command staff prepares campaign, concept, and operation plans, and the 
associated Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. They develop logistics plans and coordinate 
and supervise supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related 
logistics activities. Logistics is the key to the success of any operation whether it be military or 
civilian. Planning, coordination and pre-arranged agreements for supplies, equipment and 
manpower in a multinational response effort can make the difference in the timely delivery of 
personnel and equipment. Logistics in a multinational environment becomes a shared 
responsibility. It is important that information be exchanged in an accurate and timely manner to 
provide the most efficient means of meeting the mission requirements. Nearly all information 
shared by the Logistics Command is structured in nature since logistics deals with precise data. 
The Plans Command staff does the long-range, or future operations, planning and short-
term, or current operations, planning. The current operations planning is conducted for the next 
96 hours of the operation and future operations planning covers the 96 – 198-hour timeframe. 
Planning meetings are also an important part the battle rhythm. It is at these meetings plans are 
reviewed and discussed and agreed upon in order to gain efficiencies and keep the task force on 
the same working together toward the same mission. This includes the planning, integration and 
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coordination of combined joint operations for disaster specific task forces. The short-term 
planning is referred to as Current Operations and the long-term planning which gives a further 
look into the future is referred to as Future Operations. The information contained in the Current 
Operations and Future Operations briefings are essential to the staff for information on the 
current on-going operations as well as future operations, so they can plan accordingly. With its 
focus on crisis response, the MNF SOP defines a specific process for Crisis Action Planning 
(CAP). The phases of the CAP process include: Situation Development, Crisis Assessment, 
Course of Action Development, Course of Action Selection, Execution Planning, and Execution. 
Data types are usually mixed. 
In general, the functions of the Communications Command staff include handling 
command responsibilities for communications and frequency control, tactical communications 
planning and execution, and management and development of electronics and automatic 
information systems. Almost all the data need to support these responsibilities is structured. 
There is a broad spectrum of networks that support a wide variety of information. The 
network used usually depends on the level of classification assigned to regulate each user’s 
access to information. If information is classified, the network that supports this must be 
classified at the same level. There are networks that support intelligence information gathering 
and exchange, called the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System, known as 
JWICS. The network used to support unclassified information for the Department of Defense is 
called the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network, NIPRNET. This network can handle 
information that is up to Sensitive, but unclassified. The Department of Defense primary network 
for classified information, is the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, SIPRNET, which is 
also used by the Department of State for handling classified information up to Secret. 
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There are additional networks that support communications with other nations. Some are 
bi-lateral, in that the networks are established between two countries in order to communicate 
and coordinate. Some of these networks are multinational and include selected countries willing 
to share information with each other. The information shared is usually classified and therefore is 
protected as such and covered by a formal agreement. 
Another factors to consider is that systems administration function for the multiple 
systems that run on these various networks. This function documents and facilitates the inter-
communicability of servers that support things like email, database systems, collaboration, and 
so on. Other systems administration tasks include account management and user access control. 
Additional responsibilities can include properly configuring everything on these networks 
including the individual workstations to protect the network. 
To add to the responsibility of the Communications Command making sure the proper 
frequencies are used for radio communications is a major responsibility. This is referred to as 
spectrum management. This is important for providing proper communications to units about the 
use of radio frequencies to communicate and to avoid interfering with civil-defense and police 
pre-established use of frequency ranges, especially when working in other countries. 
Depending on the disaster response, other partners may be integrated into Joint or 
Combined Task Force, or at least work in coordination of the task force. More details about the 
kinds of partners that the U.S. military is likely to engage is the topic of the next section. 
Partners 
This research is conducted predominantly from the perspective of the U.S. military, since 
the U.S. military is often one of the first responders for HA/DR efforts around the world. One of 
the lessons learned within weeks following the 9/11 attacks, was that there were federal 
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government organizations that had information that was normally closely-held but that needed to 
be shared with other organizations which were responding to the domestic crisis. A big challenge 
in sharing with partners in this ad hoc, virtual organization was a lack of established protocols 
for providing information across a wide variety of technology platforms and in varying formats. 
Related to this lesson learned, the Governor of Hawaii, the Honorable Linda Lingle, 
approached federal, state and local agencies in the islands regarding the problem of information 
sharing and working together for the sake of meeting a common objective, whether it be national 
defense, homeland security or reacting to a natural disaster. In response, representatives from the 
Command, Control and Communications directorate at the United States Army Pacific 
Command, in Fort Shafter, Hawaii, showed up at the United States Pacific Command, in Camp 
Smith, Hawaii, to discuss with the technical staff of the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN), 
solutions for sharing information among staff who would normally keep information held close. 
This was the beginning of a national push to start breaking down walls within and 
between federal, state, and local organizations to share critical information to gain additional 
insight into the status of data sharing across the U.S. military and including U.S. federal 
government organizations. This type of situational allows decision makers at the federal 
government level and at the organizational level to make better, more informed decisions. 
Although often diverse in their organizational culture, in a disaster response operation, 
organizations are similarly asked to work together toward a common goal. Information sharing, 
planning for information sharing, pre-establishing systems authorizations and designing systems 
for transferring information across all technology platforms, is critical in achieving that goal. 
Organizations that are a part of the U.S. military are many times major partners in 
HA/DR efforts, both domestic and international. In this analysis, the organizations with whom 
30 
 
the U.S. military is likely to partner are organized into two categories: internal and external. As 
the labels imply, internal partners include traditional organizations that are part of the American 
federal government system. External partners, by contrast, refers to any non-traditional 
organizations that are not under the direct authority of the federal government. Descriptions of 
common internal and external partners in a foreign HA/DR event is provided next. 
Internal Partners 
There are a multitude of partners who are typically involved in an HA/DR relief effort. 
According to Joint Publication 3-29. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA, p. I-1), 
FHA operations (including FDR operations) are normally conducted in support 
of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the 
Department of State (DOS). 
The U.S. military regularly plans for its supporting role which will require the military 
and all relief partners to work together. For example, the State Department, a part of the U.S. 
government, and one of the Lead Federal Agencies, along with USAID, maintains an extensive 
database about nations around the world. The information is primarily for U.S. citizens that are 
traveling or long- term residents in the disaster impacted country. State Department databases 
provide information such as passport validity and visa requirements, vaccines, and currency 
restrictions. They also provide information regarding embassies and consulates within the 
country, demographics, safety and security, local laws and special circumstances, health, travel, 
and transportation in the country. 
The State Department information is valuable to the planners for an HA/DR effort. 
Databases provide demographics of the area impacted, languages spoken, and other relevant 
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information. The important thing to note, is that the database format can be easily accessed 
across any country and/or region that the planners as well as other staffs can use. 
USAID (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Support) collects information about 
Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) operating in countries throughout the world through 
their registration process. This data is used by USAID to identify partners the U.S. military can 
work with and who have access to country resources and expertise. 
External Partners 
In a foreign disaster relief effort, there are many organizations involved including relief 
agencies, non-governmental agencies, international organizations and possibly foreign and 
domestic militaries. Each of these organizations brings diverse capabilities and much needed 
personnel skill set, resources and in some cases equipment. External partner organizations also 
have structured and unstructured data that is available in a multitude of technology platforms. 
Who the U.S. military is likely to partner with and examining the ways in which information is 
share information for a coordinated response deserves examination as a part of these research. 
Typical external partners and the data they offer are reviewed next. 
The United Nations (UN) plays a major role in providing critical information related to 
disasters worldwide. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has a 
website, ReliefWeb, which is a leading humanitarian information source for global disasters. The 
primary objective of ReliefWeb is to provide reliable and timely information to those that are 
involved a disaster relief response. This provides the community (organizations, people or both) 
with information that can assist them in their planning efforts, inform disaster relief staffs of 
current operations and enable them to make more informed decisions about necessary action 
steps in any type of HA/DR event. The United Nations (UN) also uses what they call the Virtual 
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On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (OSOCC) to help coordinate international relief efforts 
and provide a collaborative platform to coordinate and share information among the international 
responders. The UN’s World Food Program gets food to where is needed in a time of emergency 
relief during natural disasters and as well as civil conflicts and war. Since both short and long-
term planning in necessary for UN operations, data sharing with the U. S. military is expected to 
occur via structured and unstructured formats. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross and The International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) are international organizations based out of Geneva 
Switzerland providing global support for humanitarian assistance. For reasons similar to the UN, 
data sharing with the U. S. military is expected to occur via structured and unstructured formats. 
Host Country Government Officials must communicate with Ambassadors and Chiefs of 
Mission from other countries when assistance from those countries is being requested. These 
communications tend to be more unstructured. 
Data Sharing Technology 
The sharing of time sensitive information between relief stakeholders following a major 
disaster is critical for an efficient relief operation (Fan & Bo, 2016) (NPS, 2012). Leaders, 
regardless of their leadership style, regardless of their role or level of responsibility, need high 
quality and timely information to make the best decisions for achieving organizational goals and 
objectives. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts, especially foreign disaster relief 
efforts, bring together a very diverse group of contributors each with its own culture, business 
processes, expertise, and resources. This adds to the complexity of information sharing and 
exchange (Bjerge & Benedikt, 2016). However, the one common factor between these groups is 
they are working to one singular goal: to provide relief to the suffering. This is important 
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because, as Leonard Wong (Wong, 1992) showed, in a leader-group interaction model, 
organizational goal acceptance leads to better group performance. 
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees understands the importance of 
information sharing. They have a handbook entitled: A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on 
Humanitarian Operations (UNHCR, 1995). In this handbook, they address the importance of 
sharing information with the military. The Department of Defense also values information 
sharing and has a publication entitled the Department of Defense Information Sharing 
Implementation Plan (DOD, 2016) that “identifies tasks to drive cultural transformation as 
needed to better promote the practice of information sharing” (p. II). When many militaries must 
work together, it is essential to have a guiding document to operate together as a coalition, a 
team of teams. That document for the Pacific Area of Responsibility is the Multinational Force 
Standing Operating Procedure (MNF SOP, 2018). This document helps facilitate a cohesive 
group when a disaster relief effort or small-scale contingency requires assistance in the form of a 
coalition or combined task force. Information sharing is identified as being essential part of any 
combined operation and provides formats and procedures for sharing information. 
Ad hoc workgroups whose membership is driven by a specific situation, such as an 
international humanitarian assistance/disaster relief effort, can become more cohesive with a 
common objective, such as providing relief. The more that information can seamlessly be shared 
across organizational boundaries, the more likely it is that leaders of each respective organization 
can make better decisions and plan effective and coordinated courses of action. To make this 
happen, it is important to determine the best way to share information in a time when there are 




For example, in the past decade, social media has garnered a tremendous amount of 
attention for its ability to get information distributed not only locally, but also regionally and 
globally in a short amount of time. This feature has propelled social media into an important 
medium to share information. It has been used in disaster relief efforts as an effective tool for 
gaining situational awareness, especially for first responders (Hossain & Kuti, 2010). The 
information provided is timely, but not always verifiable, yet it is unstructured, which allows the 
user to share information without the constraints of a formatted response. The differences 
between structured and unstructured data and how they may apply to U.S. military disaster relief 
efforts are considered next. 
Structured Data 
Webopedia defines structured data with this description: “Data that resides in a fixed 
field within a record or file is called structured data. This includes data contained in relational 
databases and spreadsheets.” Structured data definitely plays a role in disaster relief efforts 
(Kinsella, Wang, Breslin, & Hayes, 2011). The United States Agency for International 
Development / Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) makes use of a Mission 
Tasking Matrix, also known as a MITAM, which is a perfect example of structured data. The 
MITAM has a well-defined format and for good reason. It provides the relief organizers 
information they need and in a format suitable for planning disaster relief efforts. 
Structured data benefits from first creating a data model – a model of the types of data 
that will be recorded and how they will be stored, processed and accessed. This includes defining 
the fields of each data category that will be stored as well as in what format that data will be 
stored: data type (numeric, currency, alphabetic, name, date, address) and any restrictions on the 
data input (number of characters; restricted to certain terms such as Mr., Ms. or Dr.; M or F). 
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Structured data has the advantage of being easily entered, stored, queried and analyzed. 
At one time, because of the high cost and performance limitations of storage, memory and 
processing, databases and spreadsheets using structured data was the only way to effectively 
manage data. Anything that couldn't fit into a tightly organized structure would have to be stored 
on paper in a filing cabinet. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, I define structured data as data that is organized in a 
pre-defined manner, much like the databases and spreadsheets as described above. The reason 
for this is that as we examine the approach for the type of data and data applications to be used 
for information sharing for complex foreign HA/DR efforts, the reader will understand the 
different approaches and technologies involved. 
Unstructured Data 
Unstructured data is opposite of structured data, since this data is not systematically 
stored by the creator or made available in a traditional database. Unstructured data includes 
things like text messages, emails, blogs, wikis, forums, etc. Basically, unstructured data can be 
defined as anything that does not require the definitions of fields and formats, nor are there 
restrictions to provide specific information in fields or the necessity of producing the kinds of 
formats and records that make up a traditional database, list or spreadsheet. 
Unstructured data can be more time-sensitive and provide can real-time information that 
allows partner organizations to synchronize their respective activities during each disaster 
response phase. In addition, the data is responsive to changing circumstances on the ground and 
provides the information necessary to modify disaster response activities to meet ever-evolving 
needs. The challenge of unstructured data is that there is seldom sufficient time to document 
and/or verify the authenticity and accuracy of information sources. In addition, from the U.S. 
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military’s perspective the information may be valuable to unknown or unspecified partners on 
the ground for whom no security vetting is possible. 
The success or failure of the tasks provided by the can be influenced by the manner in 
which data are shared. Structured data have the advantage of being prepared in advance. This 
allows for the security restrictions on the data to be established which will provide guidance 
concerning with whom the data may be shared in real time. Unstructured data, though, offers the 
advantage of real time data that is accessible to a wider range of partners as well as interested 
persons impacted by the disaster. Having at one’s disposal multiple technology platforms, each 
uniquely suited to structured or unstructured data, requires an awareness of how to balance data 
security considerations with the need to know information in real time. 
In this section, an overview of the four factors that could influence the U.S. military’s 
choice of technology platforms for sharing disaster relief response information were reviewed. 
The first factor focused on disaster relief tasks during six different phases of a disaster response. 
Three additional factors, process support level, military command and partners were described 
since they may offer alternate explanations for data sharing activities. For normative guidance on 
how the U.S. military can optimize data sharing technology during foreign disaster relief 
activities, we now turn to scholarly literature. 
Task Technology Fit Theory for Corporations 
Task-Technology Fit theory proposes that information and communication systems that 
are aligned with individual tasks (Goodhue, 1995) or group tasks (Zigurs & Buckland, 1998) will 
have a positive correlation to performance. Since cohesive teams are usually more efficient and 
effective in the performance of their tasks and more likely to share information among members, 
it makes sense to analyze the use of technology to perform the tasks at hand and how the fit 
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between tasks and technology contribute to performance outcomes. The definitions of the tasks 
and technologies and predicted relationships between different categories of each are presented 
in this section.  
Tasks 
There are five tasks in the Task-Technology Fit theory. They are: 
1. Simple Tasks: Simple Tasks are just that, simple. They have a single outcome and 
with no interdependencies. 
2. Problem Tasks: Problem Tasks add an additional layer of complexity. It focuses on 
the best course of action with one well-defined outcome. 
3. Decision Tasks: Decision Tasks address the best solutions with multiple outcomes. 
4. Judgement Tasks: When it comes to Judgement Tasks, information processing is 
paramount especially since it deals with resolving conflict and uncertainty associated 
with the task. 
5. Fuzzy Tasks. Fuzzy Tasks deal with tasks that require the group to understand and 
structure the problem. 
Technology 
Even though Task Technology fit theory focuses primarily on the tasks performed by 
individuals inside an organization, Zigurs and Buckland (1998), they also realized and accounted 
for the necessity of analyzing tasks as they are performed by members of a group acting as a 
cohesive unit. They introduced the concept of Group Support Systems. This concept 
encompasses a wide range of decision technologies that assist individuals with a task-based 
group in identifying and addressing problems and contributing to the completion of group tasks. 
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There are three dimensions of the Group Support System that are designed to work 
together: Communications Structuring, Process Structuring, and Information Processing (Zigurs 
& Buckland, 1998). The first dimension, Communications Support provides the target audience 
with the ability for its members to communicate interactively both in real-time such as 
teleconferencing and chat, and near real time such as threaded discussions and forums. Process 
Structuring, as the second dimension, includes technology platforms that support the 
technological processes required to complete a task, such as a work-flow application. Attention 
to the technology platform is necessary to enforce process rules that are well-defined, consistent, 
and flexible within the constraints of business rules. The third dimension, Information 
Processing, encompasses the ability for all group members to collect, organize, share, access and 
evaluate information in specialized formats. 
Table 2.2 is drawn from the work of presented in Zigurs and Buckland (1998) predicts 
the fit needed between five task categories and three technology dimensions. 










Simple Tasks High Low Low 
Problem tasks Low Low High 
Decision Tasks  Low High High 
Judgement Tasks High Low High 
Fuzzy Tasks High Medium High 
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Adapting TTF Theory to the U.S. Military’s Foreign HA/DR efforts 
For this research, the expectations embedded in Task-Technology Fit theory will be used 
as the theoretical framework to examine whether technologies that support unstructured data 
such as Web 2.0 technologies and social media, or technologies that support structured data such 
as databases, spreadsheets tables and other delimited forms are better suited prior to, during and 
after a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief effort (as displayed in Table 2.4). 
The TTF theoretical framework is suitable for adaption and application to the HA/DR 
environment since both are dynamic and multi-dimensional like are the information and task 
requirements in corporations. However, the task requirements change over time as disaster relief 
efforts move through the various HA/DR phases. Starting with the Task-Technology Fit as a 
theoretical framework, the researcher modified the task characteristics, technologies used and the 
type of data they supported (structured or unstructured) to assess the fit between tasks and data 
shared across the HA/DR disaster response. 
For my adaptation of the task-technology fit model as it would apply to HA/DR settings, 
I have identified four independent variables that may influence the fit between task and 
technology and condition the overall fit between task and technology. The first independent 
variable uses the tasks that are performed in the six different phases of a HA/DR response. 
Adaptation of Tasks as Phases in HA/DR Events 
The first section of this chapter described six standard phases that guide the activities of 
the U.S. military during foreign disaster response efforts. These phases parallel the types of tasks 




• Phase 0 – Prepare. The main tasks for the U.S. military in this phase are to shape the 
environment. These tasks are accomplished through collaborative endeavors such as 
conferences, training and exercises with other regional partners. These tasks are 
considered to be equivalent to Judgement tasks in the Zigurs & Buckland framework. 
• Phase I – Assess means to develop a situational awareness of the emergency. Assessment 
and crisis action planning are the main tasks. These tasks are considered to be equivalent 
to Simple tasks in the theory predicting fit of task and technology. 
• Phase II – Response tasks relate to the movement of forces and equipment to provide 
support. In this phase, information sharing between all partners helps establish liaison 
support and interoperability. These tasks are considered to be equivalent to Problem tasks 
in the TTF framework. 
• Phase III – Execute describes how support operations are conducted. Information sharing 
to support these tasks are provided in diverse ways depending on how an organization is 
supporting the mission. For these reasons, these tasks are considered to be equivalent to 
Fuzzy tasks in Zigurs and Buckland’s theory. 
• Phase IV – Transition activities feature the planning and coordination with the Embassy 
within the affected country along with the USAID/OFDA, in order for the military to 
transition their resources away from the disaster relief mission. Information sharing is 
necessary to collaborate on the best way to transition the military mission out of country. 
For these reasons, these tasks are considered to be equivalent to Decision tasks in the 
Task-Technology Fit framework. 
• Phase V – Redeployment features tasks that analyze the most efficient and cost-effective 
ways to return military resources to the home station once the relief effort is completed. 
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For these reasons, these tasks are considered to be equivalent to Problem tasks in the 
Zigurs and Buckland theoretical framework. 
As I noted earlier in this chapter, these phases, especially Phases I through V, will 
overlap to some extent. The logic of the cross-walk between tasks and HA/DR phases follows. 
• Simple Tasks have a single outcome and with no interdependencies. Adapting this 
category to the HA/DR setting, Phase I, Assess is categorized as a simple task since the 
outcome is to provide damage, environment and causality assessments with no decisions 
require, just the assessments so planners can determine courses of action. 
• Problem Tasks focus on the best course of action with one well-defined outcome. In the 
U.S. military HA/DR efforts, Phase II, Response and Phase V, Redeploy, feature 
activities that have multiple potential courses of action that must be analyzed. 
• Decision Tasks address the best solutions for multiple outcomes. Adapting this category 
to the HA/DR setting, Phase IV, Transition is a decision task because decisions have to 
be made as to how, what and when the military transitions its role back to the relief 
organizations. These decisions are collaborative in nature and depend on the operational 
status of the relief effort. 
• Judgement Tasks require processing shared information to resolve conflict and 
uncertainty associated with a specific task. During Preparation, Phase 0, the U.S. military 
is faced with Judgement tasks as they must balance the status of diplomacy with various 
countries with the uncertainty of the type of disaster to which the organization will be 
tasked with responding. 
• Fuzzy Tasks are tasks that require a group to understand and structure the problem. This 
is equivalent to Phase III, Execute, for HA/DR efforts by the U.S. military since pre-
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programmed responses developed through Phase 0 military exercises need to be modified 
in real time to fit the country and the disaster as well as the evolving disaster response 
situation on the ground. 
Adaptation of Technology Types in HA/DR Events 
The Communications Support dimension of technology in the TTF theory is important 
for assuring that members can communicate interactively in real time. These activities clearly 
align with the sharing of unstructured data which is hosted on technology platform known for 
open communication modalities and real time distributions of information. 
The Process Structuring dimension is necessary to make sure includes technology 
platforms support processes required to complete tasks. This dimension also enforces process 
rules for using technology in ways that are well-defined, consistent, and flexible within 
constraints established by the organization. When considering the U.S. military, rules and 
constraints are necessary for structured data, but so is the ability to share on the ground condition 
information immediately for task completion. For this reason, a mix of Unstructured and 
structure is expected for the adaptation of the Zigurs and Buckland TTF frameworks process 
structuring dimension. 
The Information Processing dimension is necessary to ensure that the ability of all group 
members to collect, organize, share, access and evaluate information in specialized formats. In a 
HA/DR event, the U.S. military will provide and receive structured data from partners with 
whom they have worked/trained with previously. Many of these partners will have executed a 
bilateral agreement governing what and how information can be shared. For this reason, 
structured data is considered to be equivalent to the Information Process dimension in the Task 
Technology Fit theory.  
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Based on the rationales presented above, a strong case can be made when exploring the 
utilization of different data types as they support the three dimensions of the group support 
systems identified in the Task and Technology Fit theory of Zigurs & Buckland (1998). Table 
2.4 cross-walks the three dimensions using examples of the data commonly shared in HA/DR 
events. 
Table 2.4 Cross-Walk of Technology Dimensions to Data Type for HA/DR responses 
Dimension Examples Data Type 





Process Structuring  Agenda Setting 
Agenda enforcement 
Facilitation 
Complete record of group Interaction 
Both  






Using the adaptations, I have proposed for cross-walking the tasks to phases and the 
technology dimensions to data types, I am able to test the portability of the TTF framework to 
HA/DR responses of the U.S. military. The expected relationships between tasks organized by 
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the phase of the disaster response and technology determined by the data sharing platforms that 
are used in each respective phase are shown in Table 2.5. 







Simple: I Assess  High Low Low 
Problem: II Respond & VI Redeploy  Low Low High 
Decision: V Transition Low High High 
Judgement: 0 Prepare  High Low High 
Fuzzy: IV Execute Low Medium High 
 
Additional Variables Potentially Influencing Task and Technology Fit 
In this section, I present the predicted relationships for three additional independent 
variables that, from the literature review and my experience, are expected to come into play from 
the U.S. military perspective during a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief response. These 
factors are expected to impact the type of information that is used and the format in which it will 
be shared, i.e. unstructured or structured. 
Process Support Level 
During each phase of disaster planning and response, there can be a mix of concerns that 
span strategic, tactical and operational processes and procedures. For example, the disaster 
response activities of the U.S. military must be in line with what is contained within national 
(federal) and U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Plans. In addition, the response must take 
into consideration the tactical preferences that the impacted nation currently holds with respect to 
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the country or geographic area in which the disaster has occurred. A third process level must also 
be considered simultaneous to the other two. This level is the operational level, which refers to 
the actual procedures and processes that the U.S. military has in place at the time the disaster 
response has been initiated. The types of data technology used at these three process support 
levels may differ based on the type of information that is being shared and who will have 
security clearance to receive the data. For this reason, I expect that there will be a mix of 
structured and unstructured data shared. To determine the accuracy of this alternate hypothesis, 
the relationships between process support levels and data technology will be tested. 
Military Command 
Disaster relief efforts by the U.S. military could require the involvement and coordination 
of up to six different commands within the organizational chart. The level of activity of each 
command during HA/DR response is documented above and provides the basis for assessing the 
level of correlation with different data sharing technologies. A strong and predictable correlation 
may mean that the military command offers higher explanatory power than does the type of task 
that the U.S. military performs during foreign disaster response activities. 
Partners 
In this research, differences between the types of technology used for data sharing with 
internal and external organization partners and the U.S. military during HA/DR events will be 
considered. These categories do not define what organizations are, and what organizations are 
not, considered to be partners as much as they define the sharing of information between 
organizations with different degrees of organizational alignment with U.S. policies and which 
may or may not operate under the authority of the federal government.  
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Internal organizations are defined as organizations that operate within a legal command 
structure that is overseen by the President of the United States and carried out through federal 
organizations. External organizations are defined as organizations outside of the command and 
control structure of the U.S. federal government. As such, it is not expected that there is any 
obligation, nor historical tradition for information to be shared with the U.S. military. 
Information sharing with many internal and external partner organizations in a HA/DR 
response effort likely occurs on a regular and predictable basis. However, when taking into 
consideration the ongoing favorable relations and the likelihood of internal partners being vetted 
for security clearance, I expect internal partners to be the recipients of primarily structured data. 
This prediction is information by the fact that information sharing protocols and users and access 
levels are normally established in advance of the HA/DR event. 
For external partners, the prediction is that unstructured data will be shared most 
frequently. This prediction arises from the reality that many partners in a specific HA/DR event 
are not known until the U.S. military has already deployed to the geographic location. Therefore, 
the process of granting security clearance to the organization and specific data to different users 
affiliated with the external partners, identifying shared technology platforms, and having on the 
ground technology support to actually transfer the data will take more time and diffuse the 
resources that are needed for the actual relief efforts. 
Chapter Summary 
Based on the literature, it is expected that the type of data that is shared by the U.S. 
military during a HA/DR event (as an operational measure of technology) will vary based on the 
phase which represents important dimensions of the different tasks that must be completed when 
the U.S. military responds to a foreign disaster event. This expectation is deductively tested in 
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this research. First person participant knowledge of the two case studies was used to identify 
three additional variables associated with the U.S. military’s role in HA/DR events that may also 
be predictors of the type of data that will be shared interactively by/with the U.S. military. This 
study is exploratory research into the portability of task and technology fit theory to inter-
organizational collaborations that are ad hoc rather than relying strictly on routine tasks. 
 
Therefore, based on the adapted theoretical model of TTF theory and the addition of three 
independent variables for testing the power of alternative explanations, this research tests the 
following logic model: 
 
Figure 2.4: Logic Model Adapted from Task Technology Fit Theory 
Based on this logic model, three research questions guide the analysis: 
Research Question #1: What are the types of data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR 
events? 
Research Question #2: What is the relative fit between the Task variable and the types of 
data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
Research Question #3: Are there other factors, such as Process Support Level, Military 
Command and/or Partners, that provide a more robust explanation of the types of data shared 











RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY  
This is a comparative case study of an implementation process (Stake, 2006). 
Comparative case studies allow for the analysis and synthesis of similarities, differences and 
patterns across cases that share a common goal. This research focuses on the sharing of 
structured and unstructured data between the United States military and collaborating domestic 
and international government and non-governmental organizations during foreign humanitarian 
assistance/disaster relief events. By its very nature, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief 
features the engagement and involvement of a spontaneously formed group of actors 
representing a variety of organizations from the country that experienced the disaster as well as 
from around the world.  
Extant literature offers guidance on how best to assure the fit between task and 
technology. However, the theory is based on research on corporations and focuses on internal 
tasks and operations of which the organization has complete control. This research tests an 
adapted theoretical model to determine its robustness when applied to a set of ad hoc tasks that 
rely on known and unknown partners – specifically the U.S. military’s role when participating 
foreign disaster relief efforts.  
The outcome of the U.S. military’s HA/DR effort and impact of information sharing is 
not being analyzed. Since these were international disaster relief efforts, all cases have the same 
outcome which is that disaster relief was better than it would have been had the U.S. military not 
intervened. It is argued that there were differences in the HA/DR interventions in terms of the 
use of structured and unstructured data and seeks to test four factors that may account for these 
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differences. Thus, this analysis is a test of the design and the cases that were chosen based on the 
utilization of different types of data to accomplish the same task. 
This research design allows for the comparison of the context and how that may have 
influenced the success of the intervention. Elaborating the nuances of this context can improve 
preparation for future disaster relief efforts to avoid loss of life and property caused by these 
extreme natural disaster phenomena. 
Sources of Evidence 
This is a mixed method study drawing from a variety of sources to overcome the 
weaknesses of any one data type. The unit of analysis is the organization that was included as 
part of the official disaster response team. The unit of observation is secondary documents 
related to the relief efforts combined with first person accounts of the team’s activities and the fit 
between task and technology. The study features a mixed-methods approach that leverages the 
quantitative and qualitative data drawn from the secondary analysis and first-person accounts. 
Combined, these data sources allow for triangulation of the findings. 
The qualitative data used in my analysis draws primarily from two case studies of 
HA/DR events in which the U.S. military played a significant role in foreign disaster response 
efforts. The two cases that are compared are the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004/2005 and the 
Haiti earthquake in 2010. They were purposively selected (Yin,2014) since one relied primarily 
on structured data and the other included structured and unstructured data. 
Each case also provides a unique opportunity to include first-person observations from 
both the participant as well as the remote observer role of the author. The researcher’s 
background is with the U.S. military. As part of his duties as a military planner, the researcher, as 
an Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, was assigned to the United States Pacific Command, was 
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activated and assigned to the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team which was the core of 
the Combined Coordination Center as part of the Combined Support Force, based out of the Air 
Base in Utapao, Thailand during Operation Unified Assistance. He author was able to gain 
invaluable first-hand experience during the length of the operation. His participation benefitted 
from attendance at numerous Multinational Planning and Augmentation Team events such as the 
Tempest Express exercises and Multinational Force Standard Operating Procedures conferences 
and numerous PACOM hosted exercises with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
scenarios prior to the Indian Ocean tsunami. 
During the Haiti earthquake response effort, the researcher was a virtual observer. He 
was a member of the community of interest set up by the All Partners Access Network set up 
specifically for this relief operation. While not integrated into the Task Force, the author was 
able to monitor a lot of the activity during the operation as a member of the Community of 
Interest set on the All Partners Access Network. As a member of this community of interest, the 
researcher received on-going updates as to the progress of the relief operation. This was a 
continuation of the author’s participation in the what was formerly called the Asia-Pacific Area 
Network. The author’s role in this network facilitated the sharing of information from someone 
with real world, real-time perspectives on the use and impact of information with the key 
stakeholders during the Haiti earthquake relief effort. As a result, the study data from the 
author’s perspective based on then hands-on experience as a military professional who was an 
integrated part of both HA/DR relief efforts. 
The bulk of the secondary data analysis is drawn from rigorously developed lessons 
learned and best practices organized in a variety of military, government, educational, and 
private sector databases. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is a system 
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designed to allow stakeholders to capture/document observations and best practices that the 
stakeholders have identified as valuable information that would provide lessons learned from 
crisis and steady state operations, events, and exercises that may serve as the basis to establish 
capability requirements if analysis indicates capability gaps. 
JLLIS has been around for over 20 years and therefore provides an historical perspective 
as well. Many of military exercise planners review lessons learned cases in JLLIS as a means of 
showing trends in order to identify where training is needed to meet readiness requirements. 
JLLIS is also used to capture observations from real world operations in order to build 
meaningful training events and exercises. The observations can go through a process which 
moves the JLLIS entry from an observation to an issue and then a lesson learned. These issues 
result in policy, procedures, tactics, funding, resource deployment and other meaningful actions. 
The title Joint Lessons Learned Information System suggests that is available to only the 
various joint organizations and combatant commands, when in fact it includes all service 
commands, component commands and essentially all military organizations. What also makes 
JLLIS a valuable resource is that it also includes entries by interagency organizations that 
interface with the military as well as of those that may not. Even though this primarily for 
military and government organizations, many observations include documentation about working 
with external and international partners. 
Among the nearly 1,000 lessons learned documents are observations from military 
training exercises rather than specific foreign disaster responses. Even though these exercises are 
simulations and can be controlled, they offer tremendous insights into what should and should 
not be done on the ground in real-time disaster response activities. It is acknowledged that first-
hand, real-world observations are more compelling. But there is also an interactive effect 
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between reporting real-world and simulation outcomes as history informs future actions. 
Therefore, in this study, both real world and exercise observations are included as part of the 
analysis since each play a critical role in the selection of unstructured or structured data being 
used during a real-time foreign disaster response event in which the U.S. military participates. 
To identify materials to be analyzed from the JLLIS database, I began by using the term 
“information sharing”. This phrase could be in any part of the observation record which has 
multiple fields to capture information when capturing/documenting the observation to resolving 
the issue. The search extended across the entire spectrum of government and military 
organizations worldwide that use JLLIS. Operating as a structured database, JLLIS is the 
administrative system of record for recording and processing lessons learned. However, there are 
other military service specific lessons learn databases that also capture lessons learned. It should 
also be noted that only military and government organizations use JLLIS, although it contains 
observations that address information sharing with relief partners outside the government, 
including international organizations and non-governmental organizations. 
In JLLIS, there were only five observations directly related to information sharing during 
the Indian Ocean tsunami relief effort. The low number may be due, in part, to the lessons 
learned being submitted during the International Indian Ocean Tsunami Lessons Learned 
Conference held in Chaing Mai, Thailand, held in August of 2005 where information sharing 
lessons learned were captured and consolidated. The lessons learned documents were available 
to all participants and not necessarily uploaded to JLLIS. The Haiti earthquake in 2010 generated 
36 information sharing lessons learned directly related to the relief effort. 
These lessons learned documents are qualitative, so the data within them is converted into 
quantitative values for the variables used in the analysis. A final source of secondary data are the 
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academic case studies - books, journal articles, dissertations and theses that have covered these 
two events. 
Variable Definitions and Coding 
Most of the definitions used during this research came from the Multinational Force 
Standing Operating Procedures developed by over 30 countries in the Asia-Pacific Area of 
Responsibility. The facilitators of this document are from the Multinational Planning 
Augmentation Team out of the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. The document is an 
international document and addresses the variables used to do the research. Its focus is on 
multinational operations in the Asia-Pacific region during crisis planning but applies worldwide. 
Although its focus on military forces working together during crisis action events, it also 
addresses interoperability topics with regards to interagency partners, non-governmental 
organizations and international organizations. The definitions were also compared to similar 
definitions used by professional and academic audiences to establish consistent meanings. 
There is one control variable used in this research to differentiate between the two case 
studies and lessons learned cases from the JLLIS database. The two case studies are analyzed 
comparatively across both cases and also compared with the results from the analysis of the data 
drawn from JLLIS. As presented in the logic model at the end of Chapter 2, there are four 
independent variables used in this analysis. The type of data shared is the sole dependent 
variable. The codebook for these variables is presented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Codebook for Independent Variables 
Variable Name/Type Code Labels 






















Process Support Level (IV) 
The military planning level that provides 







Military Command Level (IV) 
The organizational unit in the 
Department of Defense hierarchy which 
would oversee tasks in a HA/DR 
















Internal partners operate under the U.S. 












Based on the technology platform that 
supports the data 
3 Mix of Structured/Unstructured Data 
 
To capture trends over time using a quasi-experiment logic, I created a second control 
variable, labeled Time Periods, and performed a sub-analysis using different time periods. The 
Time Periods variable was coded for three time periods: 1) 1997-2004, 2) 2005-2010 and 3) 
2010 – current to analyze the relationships between variables before the Indian Ocean tsunami, 
between the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Haiti earthquake, and after the Haiti earthquake and 
up to the time that the JLLIS lessons learned cases were selected in 2018. The reason for using 
2005 as a starting point is that there were very few lessons learned entries in the JLLIS database 
before 2005, making it difficult to draw any statistical conclusions that are valid. The analysis 
examines the influence of time in three dimensions as shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 Time Periods for Analysis 
Time Periods (Control) 
 
Case Analysis 2005 and 2011 
Quasi-experimental Event Analysis 2002-2004, 2005-2010, 2010-2018 
Longitudinal Analysis 1997-2018 
 
Threats to Validity 
The selection of cases for this study is purposeful since the author can provide first-
person validation of the secondary source data. However, both the data as well as the author’s 
recollection suffer from the threat associated with recalling historical events. As more and more 
time elapses, and as the world experiences more and more HA/DR events and relief efforts, there 
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is the potential for the events to be interpreted differently today than they would have been at the 
moment they occurred. In addition, while doing the data collection on information sharing 
among diverse organizations during an international relief effort, it became apparent that there 
were more lessons learned studies devoted to the Haiti relief effort than for the Indonesia 
tsunami. The analysis and findings rely heavily on triangulation of the findings to mitigate this 
threat to internal validity. 
Basing the analysis on just two cases limits the generalizability of the findings. However, 
the study begins a systematic exploration of a gap in the task-technology fit literature to 
determine its portability from a single organization with routine tasks to an episodic virtual 
organization with expected and unexpected actors who perform different tasks during the phases 
of the relief efforts. For an exploratory endeavor such as this, sacrificing precision from the 
results that can be obtained when analyzing a higher number of cases in order to provide a richer 
understanding of the context through case studies seems to be a reasonable tradeoff. Small-n 
comparative case analysis allows for close examination of contextual nuances and identification 
of future concepts that can be included in future research to overcome the threats to the external 
validity of these research results. 
Both of these events had a worldwide response that included first responders and relief 
organizations, government agencies, and non-government agencies all trying to work toward a 
common goal of providing relief. Both events also included multiple military’s responding. 
The two events selected are five years apart; a lot can change in five years. The U.S. 
military, as well as other federal agencies, continued during that period to improve their 
processes, procedures, and tactics through training, training exercises, lessons learned, and real-
world operations. By the same token, other relief organizations, local, national, and international, 
57 
 
also improved their process, procedures, and tactics including using various technologies needed 
to meet their daily operational objectives as well as to meet their needs during crises. Technology 
change is also ubiquitous. Over the time studied, technology has become more available to more 
people worldwide and social media and use of various Web 2.0 technologies has shown and 
continues to show a tremendous amount of growth. 
There are multiple independent variables in the data analysis. One variable represents 
tasks in the various phases of a relief operation and for which we use the definition of United 
State Pacific Command in their Foreign Humanitarian Operations Concept of Operations. 
Although these phases are fairly well defined, they do tend to overlap at times. This is something 
that was considered during the conduct of this research. There were also times during this 
research the author would have to make an informed decision about the phase a task was in 
based on his experience, or account for the tasks in both phases and equally weighted them if a 
clear phase could not be categorized. 
Another dimension considered during this research was the support level at which 
information was being exchanged, i.e. strategic level, operational level, and tactical levels. The 
definitions of the levels use in this research are taken from the Multinational Force Standing 
Operating Procedures. Again, as well defined as they are, and have been for many years, in 
military operations, there is sometimes a nebulous area when deciding exactly what support level 
the information is being shared. The author’s experience was used to make an informed decision 
about how to weight certain types of evidence. When weighting was not clear-cut, the evidence 




CASE #1: THE INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI 
Disasters can be natural or man-made. Examples of natural disasters would include 
hurricanes, cyclones, mudslides, wild fires, tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanoes, and so on. These 
occur around the world, many times with little warning. These disasters vary in magnitude from 
simple property damage to extensive property damage and loss of lives. 
One of the most devastating disasters in our life time was the Indian Ocean tsunami of 
2004, which was centered off the coast of Indonesia but had devastating affects throughout the 
entire region as far away as the African continent. The death toll would eventually reach nearly a 
quarter million people. This disaster and the relief efforts that followed are of great interest not 
only because of the magnitude of the disaster, the huge geographic expanse, and the amount of 
human suffering, but also the worldwide response that followed. It was a real-world event that 
would validate the need for information sharing across a wide range of organizations and shape 
how countries would respond in subsequent disasters. 
In foreign HA/DR events, there are many players involved. There are relief agencies, 
non-governmental agencies, international organizations and possibly foreign and domestic 
militaries. Each of these groups brings about unique and some not so unique roles and 
specialties. With organizations that have diverse capabilities and organizational cultures, sharing 
information with the responders is paramount for an efficient coordinated relief effort. 
Determining the best way to share information for a coordinated response deserves examination 
in order to meet the information sharing needs. 
The U.S. military’s role is to protect and defend our nation. However, there are occasions 
where the use of the military’s unique capabilities can be used in a timely manner since time is of 
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the essence in any disaster relief effort. In many instances, the military has assets and manpower 
resources available to it that would allow them to work and assist in inaccessible environments. 
Because of this, the military finds itself working with many different partners all working 
together toward a common goal. 
The United States found itself in that role in December 2004. The III Marine 
Expeditionary Force (III MEF) was tasked initially with setting up Joint Task Force 536 at 
Utapao Air base in Thailand. This would transition to an international task force called 
Combined Support Task Force 536 (CTF-536) as other countries joined the relief effort and the 
lead nation was appointed. The CTF-536 consisted of many partner organizations including 
government interagency partners, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, 
other militaries who have their own interests in the region where the instance occurs, the United 
Nations, and other relief support groups. 
The sections in this chapter follow the logic model presented at the end of Chapter One. 
Descriptions of the U.S. military’s activities during the Indian Ocean HA/DR response, 
organized by the four independent variables, are presented in sections two to five, respectively. 
In the sixth section, details about the types of data that were shared is presented. Following that, 
the final section analyzes the relative strength of relationships between each independent variable 
and the dependent variable to make conclusions about the applicability of the author-adapted 
Task Technology Fit theory and the power of competing hypotheses for explaining the type of 
data shared by the U.S. military during foreign disaster relief activities. 
Phases in the 2004 U.S. military Indian Ocean HA/DR Response 
There are similar patterns the U.S. military uses to prepare for HA/DR responses. It is 
common for the U.S. military, along with partner nations, to participate in a wide variety of 
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events that promote international cooperation and regional stability. With reference to the Indian 
Ocean, the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) covers 
more of the globe of any of the other geographic combatant commands. There are five other 
geographic combatant commands and the USAPCOM AOR shares a border with all of them. 
The objectives of these commands align with the regional security cooperation objective as part 
of the PACOM mission “to enhance stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region by promoting 
security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring 
aggression and, when necessary, fighting to win.” (http://www.pacom.mil/About-
USINDOPACOM/) 
Phase 0, Prepare 
There are many regional engagement events that occur during the year in the Asia-Pacific 
Area of Responsibility to bring together partner nations to collaborate and work together in 
preparation of a combined force response in an atmosphere of cooperation. These events 
including planning conferences, exercises (Command post Exercises, Staff Exercises, Table Top, 
Field Training), functional level seminars, training and so on. Many of these events include 
participation of interagency government organizations, international organizations, and non-
governmental organizations. 
Prior to the Indian Ocean Tsunami, USPACOM conducted a Senior Communicators 
Seminar in Sydney, Australia in 2002, with Senior Leadership to discuss a wide range of 
communications issues to include working together and how interoperability would be 
addressed. During that seminar, the participants signed a document supporting the Pacific 
Endeavor exercise which was modeled after Europe’s Combined Endeavor exercise to bring the 
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various nations together with their equipment to test interoperability issues and other 
communications issues. 
What was also interesting about that conference is there was also a Table Top exercise 
conducted and “featured” the use of the Asia-Pacific Area Network and how it could be used as 
an operational network outside the military domain to allow all partners to share information 
during a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief event. The exercise scenario was a tsunami in 
Papua New Guinea. Even though the event was a simulation, we used data from a real tsunami 
that had hit the island nation a few years earlier. The Pacific Disaster Center gave us data they 
had and from which we shaped the scenario for the exercise. Little did we know those same 
technologies would be used during the Indian Ocean Tsunami. That is why you train. 
Table 4.1: Description of Phase 0 -Preparation Activities for the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Tasks Data Types 
Training Exercises Assessments (S/U) Joint Exercise 
(S) Life Cycle Outputs 
(S) Hospital and Air field Studies 
Multinational Force Standing Operating 
Procedures Annual Conference 
 (U) Inputs/updates to MNF SOP 
 
Phase I, Assess 
Assessing the damage during the initial phase of a disaster is critical to determining the 
type and the extent of the relief effort. It is important for the decision makers to make informed 
decisions at the tactical, operational, and even the strategic levels based on the most current and 
timely information available. The information comes from many different sources not only 
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because of the number of partners but also because of the wide regional expanse of the areas that 
were impacted. For example, the United States Navy P-3 Orion aircraft, a four-engine turboprop 
anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft, out of Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, provided 
aerial photos that were made available to the Combined Task Force through the Army Corps of 
Engineers and shared through the Asia-Pacific Area Network for assessment by all partners. This 
information was valuable in providing visual information to first responders and planners to 
determine supply routes, as well as to provide an initial estimate of the extent of damage and loss 
of life. Shortly after the tsunami struck, Disaster Relief Assessment Teams, as part of the Joint 
Task Force, were on the ground in Thailand, Sri Lanka and Indonesia to provide valuable 
information to the task force for making damage assessments. The Japanese military, flying C-
130 aircraft, also sent out assessment teams to determine the extent of the damage. 
Table 4.2: Description of Phase I Assessment Activities for the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Tasks Data Types 
Damage Assessments (U) Damage Assessments 
 Food and Shelter estimates (U) Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Reports, 
NGO reports, Hospital reports 
Main Supply Routes (MSR) (U) MSR reports from military units, civil 
authorities, populace 
 
Phase II, Deploy 
The Deploy Phase was multi-dimensional because of the many partners that participated 
in the relief effort. At the operational level, military units were deployed rom various services, 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast guard. They worked together and organized initially 
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into Joint Task Force 536. With military units from around the region and around the world 
integrating into the relief effort, the task force transitioned from a Joint Task Force to a 
Combined Task Force in accordance with the Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedure. 
The U.S. Navy deployed ships from around the region to provide various types of relief. Carrier 
Strike Group 9, led by the USS Abraham Lincoln, and an Expeditionary Strike Group, led by the 
amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (the USS Essex would later relieve the USS 
Bonhomme Richard), were all dispatched to render assistance. The Navy used these and other 
ships to support the effort. Both Navy and Marine helicopters flew missions carrying relief 
supplies to the needed areas. The U.S. Navy also provided a 1,000-bed hospital ship, the USS 
Mercy. The Air Force deployed C-5, C-17, and C-130 cargo aircraft from the region. Other 
militaries also deployed air and sea assets to the region. A lot of information was shared to make 
these deployments happen including orders, medical records, logistics, inventory reports, force 
deployment data, daily update briefings, weather and other pertinent information. 
Table 4.3: Description of Phase II Deployment Activities for the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Tasks Data Types 
Organize task force (S) Inputs from participating governments 
Assign Units (S) Force Deployment Document 
Establish Lead Nation Authority (S) Document identifying authority 
Bureaucratic and Administrative  (S) Orders 
Weather (S) Forecast 
Intelligence (S) Daily reports 
Medical (S) Hospital reports, Mobile assets 
Logistics (S) Inventory, transportation reports 
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Daily Updates (S) Daily Update Brief (DUB) format 
Plan movement of supplies and personnel (S) Orders 
 
Phase III, Execute 
The bulk of relief activities took place during the Execute Phase. The task force was set 
up so that all the partners had a common understanding and situational awareness of what 
activities were going on and to plan for future activities. The Combined Support Force set up a 
daily battle rhythm so that commanders and key decision makers could get the most recent 
information and when to expect it. This provided structure and reduces chaos. Information 
sharing was a key component to this battle rhythm. During the Operation Unified Assistance, 
there were two shift-change briefs per day running under 24-hour operations. It was at these 
briefs that information was transmitted to the incoming staff for updates and the current 
situational awareness. Meetings like these covered meteorological information and forecasts, 
personnel, intelligence, current operations, future operations, communications, NGO/IO updates, 
and reports as appropriate to the operation. 
Table 4.4: Description of Phase III Execute Activities for the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Tasks Data Types 
Respond to RFIs (S) Request For Information (RFI) Forms 
Respond to RFAs (S) Request For Assistance (RFA) Forms 
 Coordination of USAID Mission Tracking 
Matrix 
(S) Mission Tracking Matrix (MITAM) – USAID 
OFDA 
Current Ops Planning (S) Operations Plan 
Future Operations Planning (S) Future Operations plan 
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Weather (S) Forecast 
Intelligence (S) Daily reports 
Daily Updates (S) DUB format 
Collect lessons learned (S) Joint Lessons Learned Issue 
IDP Camp Status (S) Camp reports 
Camp Commandant (S) Staff Knowledge Management 
 
Phase IV, Transition 
It is in the Transition Phase, that the military transitions its responsibilities back to the 
relief agencies as they are able to do so, when the military is no longer needed. During the 
tsunami relief operation, the Pacific Air Force used metrics to measure the amount of supplies 
and passengers they were providing daily to help them forecast when they would no longer be 
needed. The World Food Program had huge cargo planes that could replace that requirement 
during the initial part of relief effort when the demand was so high. Also, the Indonesia 
government did not want the military responders in their country beyond 30 days. That help set a 
target of getting relief to the victims as quickly as possible and getting out. Lieutenant General 
Blackman, Commander of the III Marine Expeditionary Force and Commander of the JTF-536, 
was asked at the end of the operation if the military was going to conduct Cobra Gold, a 
multinational exercise conducted in Thailand every year. His response was “This is Cobra Gold”. 
Table 4.5: Description of Phase IV Transition Activities for the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Tasks Data Types 
Current Ops Planning (S) Op Plan 
Future Operations Planning (S) FUOPS plan 
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Transition Planning (S) Transition Plan 
Weather (S) Forecast 
Intelligence (S) Daily reports 
Daily Updates (S) DUB format 
 
Phase V, Redeployment 
The Redeployment Phase is very much like the Deploy Phase. The units are now 
returning to their home station. This activity must be a coordinated phased approach to ensure all 
functions can be supported until the last unit leaves. In this phase, military units were sent back 
to their home stations to be re-assigned back to their steady state position. This phase was time 
sensitive for several reasons during Operation Unified Assistance. For those assigned to 
locations in Thailand including the CSF-536, there is a limit of 30 days in country without a visa. 
This rule put time pressure on those members who had to fly in through commercial aircraft 
unless they had a diplomatic passport. The other situation also involved the country that was 
most impacted by the tsunami, Malaysia. As mentioned, they gave the military 30 days to get in 
and out of Malaysia as part of the relief effort. The data required to redeploy members back to 
their home station is almost exclusively structured. 
Table 4.6: Description of Phase V Redeployment Activities for the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
Execute transition (S) Transition Plan 
Return to Home Station (S) Transition Plan 
 
The type of data that is shared across various phases does seem to change based on the 
phase of operation. Structured data was the most prominent data type used in the Deploy, 
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Redeploy, and Transition Phases. These phases were characterized by their movement of 
resources, both manpower and material, to and from the disaster response site. So much of the 
data shared in this phase was quantitative and therefore tended to be more structured. The Assess 
phase was dominated by information that in many instances was unstructured. It was in this 
phase that information was being gathered and shared from many different sources. The data was 
gathered and aggregated in order to produce information that was actionable and so that 
informed decisions could be made. The remaining phases, (i.e., Prepare and Execute), used both 
structured and unstructured data. In the Prepare Phase, the military along with relief partners 
participated in activities where ideas were shared and discussed and where collaborative 
activities took place, such as conferences to discuss multinational agreements of operating 
procedures for humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations and for small scale 
contingencies, such as PACOM’s Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures 
conference held on an annual basis. Also, in this phase databases were being built and updated 
with information on critical resources and availability of those resources needed during the 
disaster. The databases contained information on hospitals and number of beds, and medical 
equipment, length and capacity of airfields, availability and size of ports, and other such data. 
This data was structured and could easily be accessed and analyzed when in this structured 
format. This fits closely to the Zigurs and Buckland’s (1998) TTF theory which was adapted to 




Table 4.7: Application of TTF Theory based on Phases of HA/DR Operations 
Phases & (theory-
based Task Types) 
Date Types and Magnitude Compared to Expected. 
 = as theoretically expected, ? = not as theoretically expected 
 Unstructured Data  Structured & 
Unstructured Data  
Structured Data  
I Assess (Simple)  High  None  Low 











 None ?? High   High  
0 Prepare 
(Judgement) 
 High   None ?? High  
IV Execute (Fuzzy)  Low  Medium  High 
 
Process Support Levels 
For this research, I have identified three process support levels to differentiate between 
decisions that support the strategic, operational and tactical plans and priorities of the United 
States. In this section, I describe how each of these process support levels functioned during the 
Indian Ocean tsunami foreign disaster response efforts of the U.S. military. 
Strategic 
For a multinational response such as this, strategic coordination must take place to ensure 
the governments understand their role and what they are requested to do. In situations where 
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countries were not able provide the level of help that was required to meet the urgent needs they 
had to reach out to the government, through the U.S. Ambassador at the host country for 
assistance. Almost all of the data shared for strategic coordination was unstructured. 
Operational 
During a relief operation, task forces are set up to coordinate relief efforts from the 
strategic goal to the operational requirement to the tactical responders. The Joint Operations 
Centers were set up for that type of information exchange at the operational level. The Task 
Force for this event was a Combined Task Force (CTF) with 15 different militaries from around 
the world. The CTF was key to collaborating in such a wide spread operation. To coordinate 
these operations, there was a heavy reliance on structured data. 
Tactical 
Tactical level information was shared with and among units on the ground or providing 
naval or air support. Tactical level information allowed these units to do their required tasks and 
report operational objectives. The technology used to share tactical data information was 
balanced between technology platforms featuring unstructured and other technological platforms 
designed for structured data; however, there were also a few cases where a combination of data 
was shared across technology platforms simultaneously. A good example of this was the aerial 
photos provided by the U.S. Navy. They were essentially providing unstructured information 
until the Corps of Engineering geo-referenced the photos in a structured format that made sense 
and provided a larger operational picture. 
Table 4.8 Relationship Between Process Support Levels and Data Sharing Magnitude 
 Unstructured Data  Structured & 
Unstructured Data  
Structured Data  
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Strategic High None None 
Operational Low Low High 
Tactical Medium Low Medium 
 
As displayed in Table 4.8, there does appear to be systematic differences in the type of 
data shared when taking into consideration the three process support levels. Unstructured data is 
dominant at the strategic level, perhaps because real-time data concerning on the ground 
conditions caused adaptive responses in strategy. The highest use of structured data occurred for 
operational activities. This also make sense since the U.S. military was the primary actor for 
these kinds of tasks and training exercises were opportunities to develop protocols for vetting 
and sharing pre-existing data about how tasks should be carried out. There was a mix of data 
types of tactical support. This is reasonable since the activities that were tactical were practiced 
in response, but also were adapted to the way the disaster response unfolded in-country. 
Command Level 
Since so many militaries worked together, it was essential to have a guiding document to 
operate together as a coalition, a team of teams. That document for the Pacific Area of 
Responsibility was the Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedure. This document 
helped facilitate a cohesive group when the disaster relief effort had contingencies that required 
assistance in the form of a coalition or combined task force. Information sharing was identified 
as being essential part of the combined operation and provided formats and procedures for 
sharing information. 
If there is a multinational response in the Asia-Pacific Area of responsibility, where a 
military response is requested by the host nation or nations in the case of a regional disaster, then 
71 
 
it is likely that a Multinational Combined Task Force will be formed. From a military perspective 
in the Asia-Pacific Area of Responsibility (AOR), the MNF SOP defined what this task force 
would look like and how it was executed. The staffs that were described in the MNF SOP were 
very closely aligned with the way traditional joint staffs are set up. 
Personnel 
The Indian Ocean Tsunami relief added an additional level of complexity for many 
different reasons. For example, the staff itself was a combined staff because it was multinational. 
The designation for this staff is C-1. If it had been a unilateral response from the United States 
only, it would have been set up as a Joint Task Force, rather than a Combined Task Force. For 
Operation Unified Assistance, the Combined Task Force, also referred to as the Combined 
Support Force, was set up at the Thai Royal Navy Base in Utapao, Thailand which had a very 
large capacity runway and tarmac and was excellent for use as a staging area for the relief effort. 
Also, since this operation was taking place in a foreign country, the staff also had to be 
aware of bureaucratic requirements required of the host nation. For example, some of the 
members of the Combined Support Force arrived in country on tourist passports which had a 
limitation of 30 days. Some members were required to stay longer than this and required getting 
an exception so that there would be no problems at immigration upon departure. 
These types of activities required coordination and information sharing so that these 
personnel situations could be addressed. We were fortunate as a country that English is fairly 
common in the region, but still translation was required where English was not spoken. Most of 
the data that the C-1 collected, monitored and shared was structured. Taking a look at the chart 




Table 4.9 Information tracked by the C1 Staff 
 
Table 4.9, from the MNF SOP, depicts the type of information the C1 tracked during 
multinational operations in accordance policies and procedures. Note that the information was 
tubular and structured. 
Intelligence 
During Operation Unified Assistance, intelligence information was shared with the entire 
Combined Support Force. This is mentioned since normally intelligence information is 
considered sensitive. In fact, the intelligence community has its own network. In the case of this 
relief operation however, intelligence information contained various, unclassified information 
that could be shared. This ability was extremely valuable to the task force when assessing the 
situation and developing courses of actions and plans. The III MEF intelligence office posted 
daily intelligence information on the Asia-Pacific Area Network. 
Operations 
Operations during Unified Assistance were no different. Important decisions were being 
made throughout the day and to make the most informed decisions, leaders needed good, timely, 
accurate information. A daily update brief to the commander is usually presented at the 
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operational level. For example, the commander might take a briefing from the C-1 staff on the 
number of units he has at his disposal and what their expertise is. Then, he might get a brief from 
the C-2 on intelligence reports on the situation for his awareness. This might then be followed by 
briefs from the C-3 on current and future operations, which addresses immediate operational 
concerns (current operation) and a look a little further out (future operations). Logistics 
obviously is key to any operation and the C-4 would provide the commander with information on 
aircraft, ships, transportation capabilities to move personnel and equipment. The C-6 would 
provide the commander communications status around a broad range of communications assets, 
including in-country capabilities as well as satellite capabilities, ground, air and sea 
communications, and so on. It doesn’t end there. Briefings are given to the commander from 
meteorological  experts on current and projected weather in the area of operations, from the legal 
staff to ensure compliance with U.S. and international law, from other special staffs such as the 
chaplain’s office and even the Camp Commandant if the CTF is large enough. 
The key to all these briefs is that they have good actionable information that is concise, 
and which will help the commander and his staff to make decisions. The information shared 
during the Indian Ocean tsunami response was mostly structured since the data was quantitative. 
However, there was also a good share of unstructured data. 
Logistics 
During Operation Unified Assistance, frequent meetings, both formal and informal were 
held between the militaries involved in the operation and the Joint Logistic Agency 
representatives to plan for the logistics support based on priorities. The C-4 developed logistics 
plans and coordinated and supervised the supplies, maintenance, repair, evacuation, 




The Plans directorate was closely tied to the C-3 Operations because of its role to provide 
planning during a crisis operation. The two staffs work close together because these plans 
address the operations as they were being conducted. 
Communications 
Although a SIPRNET café was set up within the CTF-536 compound it was not the 
primary network used for communications. The primary means of communication was via 
commercial internet. Because of pre-established relationships with local communications 
providers for this type of service, the task force was able to set up commercial communications 
satellites on the compound to establish the needed communications environment. Because of this 
all partners participating in the operation had access. Although the military networks were also in 
place and operation they were not used nearly as extensively as the commercial network because 
of the domain restrictions of the military networks. 
Partners 
Partners are the organizations that were part of the relief effort and part of the CSF-536. 
These were organizations outside the U.S. Military organizations and include military, 
government, non-governmental, international, and regional/local organizations. Partners are 
examined as internal and external partners as described next. 
Internal 
During the relief effort the U.S. military established the Combined Support Force 536. 
Military partners from around the world made up the Combined Coordination Center within the 
CSF-536. The Center included interagency partners such as the State Department and USAID, 
Joint Logistic Agency and so on. The III Marine Expeditionary Group (III MEF) established the 
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initial Joint Task Force, the JTF-536, and transitioned to CTF-536, as other countries were 
integrated. Later it was renamed as the Combined Support Force. The members of the original 
JTF-536, consisting of military members are considered to be the internal partners. 
These are military organizations that made up the task force and information among these 
organizations that were also considered internal. Internal information sharing occurred on a 
regular basis through the CSF-536. Much of the information at the operational level, which 
occurred in the task force was structured and in many cases was quantifiable summary 
information to include information such as hospital availability and air field operations. This 
information was invaluable in providing situational awareness and giving the decision makers a 
better understanding in order to make informed decisions. 
External 
During Operation Unified Assistance, the United Nations (UN) Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) made use of their Virtual On-Site Operations 
Coordination Centre (OSOCC) which they use on a regular basis to assist in coordinating 
international relief efforts. The original concept was originally developed by OCHA and the 
International Search and Rescue Advisory Group network. UN OCHA deals with the response to 
natural disasters as part of their mission to “mobilize and coordinate effective and principled 
humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors”. During Operation 
Unified Assistance members of the CTF-536 had accounts set up with the UN OCHA Virtual 
OSOCC in order to exchange/share information to improve coordination and situational 
awareness. Exchange of information went both ways between the Virtual OSOCC and APAN’s 
Virtual Information Center. 
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Another UN OCHA resource used during Operation Unified Assistance was Relief Web. 
Relief Web is a leading humanitarian information source on global crises and disasters used by 
many non-governmental and international organizations around the world. They provided 
reliable and timely information, enabling humanitarian workers to make informed decisions and 
to plan effective responses. They collected and delivered key information, including the latest 
reports, maps and infographics from trusted sources. 
Because of the infamous Ring of Fire that causes havoc in the Asia-Pacific region and 
because of its volatile weather and other natural phenomena, natural disasters are unfortunately a 
common occurrence. There are some natural disasters that are large and complex enough that the 
country in which it occurs is not able to handle the relief efforts and must reach outside their own 
resources. At times, the government of the affected nation(s) in coordination with the 
ambassador to that country, the State Department, and USAID, and through USAID the U.S. 
military is asked to support the relief effort. 
The U.S. military’s Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) 
communication system was used by the organizations within the combined task force to 
exchange information among the various and diverse organization. APAN allowed for 
coordination and collaboration among all nontraditional security partners, as well as non-military 
partners, who were key to the success of this enormous international relief effort. 
The U.S. military’s role extended beyond providing access to APAN. In addition, they 
were asked to coordinate, collaborate and provide situational awareness. APAN was set up as a 
regional security cooperation network along with other regional security cooperation networks 
such as America’s Net in South America, Partnership for Peace Information Management 
System in Europe and Harmony Web in the Middle East Region. In order to gain efficiencies, 
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reduce redundancies, and standardize some of the applications, the Asia-Pacific Area Network 
became the All Partners Assess Network with a global reach to address the same mission set and 
essentially become the Unclassified Information Sharing System for DoD worldwide. 
Table 4.11 Type of Data Shared with Partners 
 Unstructured Data  Structured & 
Unstructured Data  
Structured Data  
Internal High High High 
External Low Medium High 
 
Analysis of Data Sharing Activities 
When analyzing the Indian Ocean tsunami relief effort, the Phases variable was the best 
predictor of the type of data that was shared. All the cells in the table were as predicted except 
for two cells. One cell was in the Transition phase which is a Decision Task. The theoretical 
expectation was that there would be a high percentage mix of structured and unstructured data; 
however, in this case, there was no mix of data with a 100 percent reliance on structured data. 
This was probably because the Transition phase has more concern with internal organizations 
turning over these tasks to the external organizations. 
The second place where the case did not support the theory was during the Prepare phase. 
As a judgement task, it was expected that the use of structured data would be high. Instead, it 
included unstructured data as well. Databases to track training objectives prior to and during 
exercises, scenario events to be injected to the exercise to help the training audience to meet their 
training requirements, and other databases and spreadsheets that help planners to execute 
exercises were used. Also, intelligence gathered on airfield capacity to determine the type of 
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aircraft that can land there, size of the tarmac, and other airfield related information to plan 
missions was provided to planners. Information was also gathered and stored on hospitals, what 
capabilities they have, the number of beds and other factors. All of this data are structured. 
Level of support does not seem to be a good indicator, except for the Strategic level. At 
the Strategic level unstructured information sharing allowed the partners to have an open forum 
for the free flow of ideas and concepts. This facilitated the development of plans and policies. It 
also allowed for an unrestricted collaborative environment. 
Command level was a good predictor of data shared for logistics and communications 
Structured data was expected, since the information they dealt with was quantitative. However, 
intelligence and operations data used a mix of data type, so this variable was not necessarily a 
good indicator for the type of data that was used. Plans were adapted in real time, but also 
contained data that was structured. Therefore, the command level was not determined to be a 
variable with strong explanatory power. 
Internal versus external partners with whom information was shared, alone is not a strong 
predictor. However, when combined with the Phases variable, the ability to predict the type of 
data shared increases. For example, during Assess phase almost all data from external 
organizations was unstructured. Another example was during the Deploy phase where the 
internal organizations almost always dealt with structured data, such as flight manifests and 
plans. 
Considering each of the four independent variables, the Phases variable offers the 
greatest support for the TTF theory as modified and applied to HA/DR. However, as shown in 
Table 4.12, there does seem to be a pattern from which one could argue that partners may be a 
mediating variable between the phases in which the military tasks are performed and the types of 
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technology platforms used for sharing data. These findings will be triangulated based on the 
many lessons learned that came out of this relief operation. However, from the case data alone, 
we see a pattern suggestive of the intersection of tasks, partners and data sharing. This tentative 
finding will be explored in the following two chapters to see if it is idiosyncratic to the Indian 
Ocean case or whether there is a relationship that holds true in other settings and time periods. 
Table 4.12 Provisional Identification of a Mediating Variable Relationship 





Internal = High 
External = Medium 
 
(U/S) Training objectives / databases 
(S) Airfield and Hospital studies 
(U) Exercises/port calls/meetings 
Phase I: 
Damage Assessments 
Food and Shelter 
estimates 
Main Supply Routes 
Area Assessments 
Internal = High 
External = High 
 
(U) Damage Assessments 
(U) IDP Reports, NGO reports, Hospital 
reports 
(U) MSR reports from military units, civil 
authorities, populace 
 (S) Airfield and Hospital studies 
Phase II: Damage 
Assessments 
Food and Shelter 
estimates 
Main Supply Routes 
Internal = High 
External = Low 
(S) Organize task force 
(S) Assign Units 








(S) Daily Updates 
(S) Plan movement of supplies and personnel 
(S) Mapping 














Plan movement of 
supplies and personnel 
Internal = High 
External = High 
(S/U) Respond to RFIs 
(S/U) Respond to RFAs 
(S) Coordination of USAID Mission Tracking 
Matrix 
(S) Current Ops Planning 
(S) Future Operations Planning 
(S) Weather 
(S/U) Intelligence 
(S/U) Daily Updates 
(S) Collect lessons learned 
(S) Mapping 
(S) Ariel and ground photos (U) Inputs from 
participating partners, interagency and 
international 





(S) Daily Reports 
(S) Hospital reports 
(S) Mobile assets 
(S) Inventory 
(S) transportation reports 
(S) DUB format 
(S) Orders 
Phase IV 







Internal = High 
External = Medium  
(S) Op Plan 
(S) FUOPS plan 
(S) Transition Plan 
(S) Forecast 
(S) Daily Reports 
(S) DUB Format 
Phase V 
Execute transition 
Return to Home Station 
Internal = High 
External = Low 
(S) Transition Plan 
 
Chapter Summary 
The Indian Ocean case study offers excellent examples of the sharing of data between 
disparate group of organizations working together toward a common goal of disaster relief. 
Through case analysis, we are able to provide provisional answers to the research questions. 
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➢ Research Question #1: What are the types of data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR 
events? 
The last table in this chapter visually demonstrated the high reliance on structured data by 
U.S. military organizations that were providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief on the 
heels of the 2004/2005 Indian Ocean tsunami which had such devastating effects on people and 
property in the region. 
➢ Research Question #2: What is the relative fit between the Task variable and the types of 
data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
It does appear that the use of the Phases variable to represent tasks gives good insight into 
what types of data sharing technology platforms were used. Therefore, as I predicted in Chapter 
Two, the adapted model of the fit between task and technology is a good predictor of the 
technology platforms that the U.S. military uses in foreign disaster relief activities. 
 
➢ Research Question #3: Are there other factors, such as Process Support Level, Military 
Command and/or Partners, that provide a more robust explanation of the types of data 
shared during the activities of the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
When analyzing the Indian Ocean tsunami case, I found that the partner variable offers 
strong explanatory power as a mediating variable. There is also some explanatory power found 
in the process support level. In the next chapter, a second case study is described and analyzed to 
provide a basis for comparing the patterns between variables suggested by this case. The use of 
structured data was as expected. However, the sharing of unstructured data was significantly less 





THE 2010 HAITI EARTHQUAKE 
In 2011, United States Navy Lieutenants Clayton Beas and Brian Lysne, authored an 
investigative report on inter-organizational collaboration during the Haiti Relief effort. This 
report discussed that Asia-Pacific Area Network and how it had been successful as a tool for 
support of the U.S. military command in meeting information exchange and collaboration needs 
and supporting the regional security cooperation requirement sin the Asia-Pacific region since 
March 2000. Ten years later, the name was changed from the Asia-Pacific Area Network to the 
All Partners Access Network (APAN). The name change reflects a shift that made APAN a 
global resource to support regional security needs around the world. Beas and Lysne’s concluded 
that during the Haiti relief efforts APAN “proved useful in bringing together many aid groups, 
including several U.S. government entities, to effectively address Haiti’s needs.” (Beas and 
Lysne, 2011, p. v). 
Five years after the Indian Ocean tsunami that was generated by a massive 9.0 earthquake 
off the coast of Sumatra, Indonesia, another natural disaster occurred on the island nation of 
Haiti. On January 20, 2010, an earthquake with an epicenter 16 miles west of the Haitian capital 
of Port-au-Prince devastated the island nation. Over 200,000 lives were lost and as many as 1.5 
million were displaced. In addition, there was massive property and infrastructure damage. There 
are many similarities between these two natural disasters even though they occurred five years 
apart. One similarity is the level of devastation and need for disaster relief and humanitarian 
assistance to be provided by foreign partners. 
Since the response was beyond the capabilities of the Haiti nation acting alone, the U.S. 
and other military organizations, as well as non-government and international organizations 
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quickly responded to fill resource gaps. This chapter explores how data was shared during the 
foreign disaster response efforts through description of the different response phases, process 
support levels, military command and partners in the U.S. military’s HA/DR response to the 
Haiti earthquake. 
Phases in the 2010 U.S. military Haiti Earthquake HA/DR Response 
The Haiti earthquake required a similar response as Indian Ocean tsunami. The phases of 
the HA/DR relief efforts were very similar to those described for the Indian Ocean tsunami. In 
this section, I describe the U.S. military tasks as part for the foreign disaster response.  
Phase 0, Prepare 
The Prepare Phase is a way for military planners to shape the environment by planning 
and practicing how the U.S. military will respond to natural disasters. Planning and exercises 
allow organizations, often from multiple countries, to get “on the same page” about what needs 
to be coordinated during a natural disaster, then decide, practice and plan how they are going to 
work together, even though the disaster context in which they will work together is unknown.  
SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Southern Command, a joint command whose area of 
responsibility covers Haiti, is not a stranger to natural disasters. They regularly conduct major 
military exercises to practice the processes, procedures, and tactics used to coordinate during a 
response all in the name of preparation. Two of the major exercises SOUTHCOM conducts are 
Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarius, and Trade Winds. Both are multinational exercises, and each has 
a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief component. 
In an odd coincidence, the day prior to the Haiti earthquake, the Defense Information 
System Agency (DISA) was at SOUTHCOM for the test of the Transnational Information 
Sharing Cooperation (TISC) project which simulated information systems in case of a major 
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emergency relief in Haiti. APAN was a major component of the TISC. APAN’s new technology 
platform went “live” in support of the relief operation, essentially going from a Phase 0 event to 
a Phase I in just a matter of days. This was a time where APAN was beginning to replace the 
regional cooperation networks and begin its global reach. 
Another example of Phase 0 activities is the Medical Readiness Training Exercises 
conducted by SOUTHCOM. In 2006, USSOUTHCOM sponsored 69 Medical Readiness 
Training Exercises in 15 nations, providing medical services to more than 270,000 citizens from 
the region (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Southern_Command, 2018). Table 1 
shows these activities and the data types that would be shared. 
Table 5.1: Description of Phase 0 -Preparation Activities for the Haiti Earthquake 
Task Data Types 
Exercises (U/S) Training objectives / databases 
Area Assessments (S) Airfield and Hospital studies 
 
Phase I, Assess 
The Joint Research Centre (JRC) used the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System 
(GDACS), which is a web-based platform developed by the JRC and the United Nations. The 
system was able to detect the first shock and issued an alert to 8,500 aid and first response 
organizations. 
World Vision also produced a rapid assessment which was carried out both in the greater 
Port-au-Prince area, as well as out in the countryside where World Vision worked. This report 
was made available to relief organizations to help provide action information for the relief actors. 
The United Nations used several different web portals/platforms managed by the United 
Nations – Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN-OCHA) to monitor the relief 
situation following the earthquake they included the: 
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➢ Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System (GDACS) 
➢ Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Center (VOSOCC) 
➢ ReliefWeb 
➢ One Response 
While the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System issued alerts to first responders, the 
VOSOCC was used to help mobilize and coordinate deployment of United Nations Disaster 
Assessment Coordination Teams to Port-au-Prince. The OneResponse portal developed by UN 
OCHA was one of the technology platforms, along with ReliefWeb to share data, information, 
and analysis related to clusters, which were groups of humanitarian organizations and designated 
by the Inter Agency Standing Committee. Figure 5.1 is a graphic developed by UN OCHA 
providing example of clusters that would be expected in a HA/DR disaster response. 
 
Figure 5.1 United Nations Disaster Response Clusters of Responding Organizations 
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There were other information management tools used to help to facilitate humanitarian 
coordination and collaboration. They included: 
➢ GoogleGroups 
➢ The Joint Operations Tasking Center (JOTC) logistics form 
➢ Who is Doing What Where (3W) database 
➢ Multi-Cluster Rapid Assessment Methodology 
o Displacement Tracking Matrix, Post Disaster Needs Assessment and Recovery 
Framework 
o Cluster Meeting calendar and directories 
The APAN was used as an information sharing portal as well. This web-based platform 
provided as a resource for information sharing among and relief organizations, governmental and 
non-governmental as well as the military. APAN was not only a repository of data but the 
database also supported collaborative technologies such as web-based chat, video, file sharing, 
forums and a one stop location of links to other information products the others host. Access to 
APAN was critical since it was a centralized technology platform from which the relief actors, 
both military but also non-military could share and exchange information to get a more complete 
picture of the situation on the ground. This allowed decision makers and planners to make plans 
based on the real-time situation. 
A posting on APAN’s website gives an excellent example of how this technology 
allowed for data sharing to the broader relief organization community. If this resource solution 
had not been found, the relief efforts would have been hampered. 
For instance, the Hospital Sacre Coeur in Milot, Haiti was unaffected by 
the earthquake. It was equipped with a full staff along with 73 available beds, yet 
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four days after the initial earthquake, the hospital had only six patients. Personnel 
at the hospital used the community to post a message stating beds were available; 
shortly after, patients started to arrive. Within a week from posting on the Haiti 
HADR Community, the hospital staff treated nearly 250 severely injured people. 
 
Figure 5.2 Example of the APAN Portal for Multiple Technologies 
This was not the first time APAN has been used for this type of tactical level application. 
It was used on numerous other occasions. The first documented use of APAN was from the 
Philippines when the Civil Affairs group reached out to the community worldwide in 2000. 
Knights Bridge, an NGO, submitted a request for assistance through APAN for a prosthetic leg 
for a soldier from the Philippines who had severely injured his leg. Within 24 hours they had a 
donor from the west coast. Table 5.2 recaps data sharing in Phase I. 
Table 5.2: Description of Phase I -Assessment Activities for the Haiti Earthquake 
Task Data Type 
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Damage Assessments (U) Damage Assessments 
Food and Shelter estimates (U) IDP Reports, NGO reports, Hospital reports 
Main Supply Routes (U) MSR reports from military units, civil authorities, 
populace 
 
Phase II, Respond 
Taken from a military perspective, during the respond phase, personnel staff manage 
manpower resources and administration, develop personnel policies, administer military and 
civilian personnel from all nations participating within the CTF. Table 5.3, from the MNF SOP, 
depics the type of information the C1 tracked during the a multinational operation in accordance 
policies and procedures. Note that the information is tublar and structured. A lot of this 
information must be closely held in a disaster response since it deals with sensitive issues related 
to troop strength and movement and to protect the privacy of individuals. This information was 
for command and control and was shared only on closed networks. 




There were many and varied military units that deployed as part of Operation Unified 
Response and all had to management and track the personnel and resources that would be 
involved. The following are some of the units that were part of the operation: 
o United States Coast Guard cutters 
▪ USCGC Forward (WMEC-911) 
▪ USCGC Mohawk (WMEC-913) 
o USCGC Valiant (WMEC-621) 
o USCGC Tahoma (WMEC-908) 
o U.S. Navy 
▪ Destroyer USS Higgins (DDG-76). 
▪ USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) 
▪ USNS Comfort (T-AH-20) 
▪ USS Underwood (FFG-36) 
▪ USS Normandy (CG-60) 
▪ USS Bataan (LHD-5) 
▪ USS Carter Hall (LSD-50) 
▪ USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43) 
▪ USS Bunker Hill (CG-52) 
▪ USCGC Oak (WLB-211) 
▪ USNS Grasp (T-ARS-51) 
▪ USS Gunston Hall (LSD-44) 
▪ USS Nassau (LHA-4) 
▪ USS Mesa Verde (LPD-19) 
▪ USS Ashland (LSD-48) 
▪ USNS Henson (T-AGS-63) 
o United States Air Force 
o Special Operations MC-130H Combat Talon II 
o United States Air Force Special Operations  
o 260th Air Traffic Control Squadron (ATCS) 
o 248th ATCS 
o 258th ATCS 
o United States Marines 
o 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit from Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune 
o 24th MEU 
o United States Army 
o XVIII Airborne Corps HQ 
o 82nd Airborne Division 
➢ National Guard 





Table 5.4: Description of Phase II -Deployment Activities for the 2010 Haiti Earthquake 
Task Data Type 
Organize task force (S) Inputs from participating partners 
Assign Units (S) Force Deployment Document 
Bureaucratic & Administrative (S) Orders 
Weather (S) Forecast 
Intelligence (S) Daily reports 
Medical (S) Hospital reports, (S) Mobile assets  
Logistics (S) Inventory, 
(S) transportation reports 
Daily Updates (S) DUB format 
Plan movement of supplies and personnel (S) Orders 
 
Phase III, Execute 
The Joint Task Force – Haiti was set up by SOUTHCOM under the command of General 
Keen from SOUTHCOM. It was decided not to set up a combined task force similar to the 
Combined Task Force set up as part of the Indian Ocean relief effort. However, the Joint Task 
Force – Haiti did work in close coordination with the already established United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti peacekeepers. 
Table 5.5: Description of Phase III - Execute Activities for the 2010 Haiti Earthquake 
Task Data Type 
Respond to RFIs (U) RFI 
Respond to RFAs (U) RFA 
Coordination of USAID Mission Tracking Matrix (S) MITAM 
Current Ops Planning (S) Op Plan 
Future Operations Planning (S) FUOPS plan 
Weather (S) Forecast 
Intelligence (S) Daily reports 
Daily Updates (S) DUB format 
Collect lessons learned (S) Joint Lessons Learned Issue 




The following highlight a few of the key contributions that JTF-Haiti made during the 
response and recovery time periods (U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2010): 
o Evacuated 16,412 U.S. citizens 
o Medically evacuated 343 patients 
o Delivered more than 2.6 million liters of water 
o Delivered 17 million lb. of bulk food 
o Delivered 5.7 million individual meals or rations 
o Conducted more than 1,000 surgeries 
o Treated more than 9,000 patients 
o Provided emergency shelter for 1.7 million people 
o Cleared 12,274 cubic yards of rubble 
o Assessed the structural integrity of more than 25,000 buildings and homes 
▪ Reopened the airport to operations enabling the delivery of 36 tons of emergency relief 
supplies and equipment 
▪ Assisted in reopening docking facilities enabling the delivery of more than 
8,000 shipping containers 
Phase IV, Transition 
Coordination with the USAID and the NGO/IO community was critical for the smooth 
transition of relief efforts back to the civilian sector. The military’s role wound down as the 
initial relief needs are met and the unique capabilities and resources of the military were no 
longer needed. This was a coordinated effort that relieved the military of future tasks. 
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As we see this transition occurring, we see our civilian partners increase their capabilities 
-- both the government here in Haiti as well as the non-government organizations -- we 
see the need for our military assistance dwindling," said Keen. "However, at the present 
time, there is still great need across the board. And we still remain decisively engaged 
providing critical assistance".  
(US Haiti Relief Effort in Transition to Civilian Phase, https://www.voanews.com/a/haiti-
relief-effort-transition-civilian-phase-84630552/163804.html, p. 1) 
 
Figure 5.3 U.S. Army special forces Lt. General Kenneth Keen (L) with a refugee family in a 
makeshift shelter camp near the Presidential palace in Port-au-Prince (File) (source). 
Table 5.6: Description of Phase IV -Transition Activities for the 2010 Haiti Earthquake 
Task Data Type 
Current Ops Planning (S) Op Plan 
Future Operations Planning (S) FUOPS plan 
Transition Planning (S) Transition Plan 
Weather (S) Forecast 
Intelligence (S) Daily reports 




Phase V: Redeploy 
This phase is very much like the Respond page except now the relief team was returning 
to their home stations or reassigned them to other areas as needed. The transition plan that 
supported the Phase V Redeployment activities relied on structured data (See Table 5.7). 
Table 5.7: Description of Phase V - Redeployment Activities for Haiti Earthquake 
Task Data Type 
Execute transition (S) Transition Plan 
Return to Home Station (S) Transition Plan 
 
The type of data shared across various phases did seem to change during the Haiti 
earthquake response based on the tasks of the U.S. military in each phase. Structured data was 
the most prominent data type used in the Deploy Phase, the Redeploy Phase, and the Transition 
Phase. These phases were characterized by their movement of resources, both manpower and 
material, to and from the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. So much of the data shared 
in this phase was quantitative, and therefore tended to be more structured. The Assess phase was 
dominated by information that in many instances was unstructured. It is in the phase that 
information was being gathered and shared from many different sources. The data was 
aggregated to produce information that was actionable and allowed informed decision making. 
The remaining phases, (i.e., Prepare and Execute), used both structured and unstructured 
data. In the Prepare Phase the military, along with relief partners, participated in activities where 
ideas were shared and discussed and where collaborative activities, such as conferences set up to 
discuss multinational agreements of operating procedures for humanitarian operations and small-
scale contingencies, took place. Also, in this phase databases were being built and updated with 
information on critical resources and the availability of those resources during a disaster. The 
databases contained information on hospitals and number of beds, and medical equipment, length 
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and capacity of airfields, availability and size of ports, and other such data. This data was 
structured and could easily be accessed and analyzed. Table 5.8 provides recaps of the findings 
for task activities by phase and the type of data that was shared during the Haiti earthquake 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. Reviewing the cells in this table, there are 
only two cells, the used a mix of data in the transition phase and the high use of structured data 
in the Prepare phase, that challenge the adaptation of Zigurs and Buckland (1998) Task and 
Technology Fit theory. 
 
Table 5.8: Application of TTF Theory based on Phases of HA/DR Operations 
Phases & (theory-
based Task Types) 
Date Types and Magnitude Compared to Expected. 
 = as theoretically expected, ? = not as theoretically expected 
 Unstructured Data  Structured & 
Unstructured Data  
Structured Data  
I Assess (Simple)  High  None  Low 











 Low ?? None  High 
0 Prepare 
(Judgement) 
 High  None ?? High 




Process Support Levels 
The three levels of support examined in this research are associated with the organization 
as it is related to their role whether be it strategic, operational, or tactical. The Strategic level of 
support shared data among organizations responsible for the national interests, policy making 
and strategies during the Haiti earthquake response. The operational level connected command 
level goals to the details forwarded to the tactical units that carried out the strategy. The specific 
types of data that were shared for each of these three levels is shown in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 Data Types based on Level of Support 




(U/S) Joint Exercise Life Cycle Outputs 
Strategic 
Operational  
(U) Multinational Agreements /MOUs  
Operational (U) Damage Assessments 




(S) Joint Exercise Life Cycle Outputs 
 Inputs from participating partners, interagency and international 
Force Deployment Document 




Hospital reports, Mobile assets 















Tactical (S/U) Joint Exercise Life Cycle Outputs 
 
Strategic 
Strategic messaging was important in informing the public of the relief efforts and the 
collaborative environment in which the relief operation was being conducted. This was 
especially true since the U.S. military was part of the operation and played a non-traditional role 
coordinating with other relief partners. Much of the information sharing at the strategic level 
came from training exercises and multinational strategic engagements with partner nations in the 
region of which SOUTHCOM was a part. Most all of the information exchanged was at the 
operational level and covered all phases. The sharing of information allowed the partners to 
make decisions together based on the situation. It also facilitated the giving of directions to the 
tactical units to execute their techniques and procedures. 
Information sharing at the strategic level was usually unstructured. This allowed the 
partners maximum flexibility to share information regardless of the format. It also allowed for an 
open exchange of ideas, especially during engagement events where stakeholders discussed 
options in an open, collaborative environment. A good example of this was bi-lateral and 
multilateral conferences on topics ranging from medical to communications issues. 
Operational 
At the operational level, the data was sometimes shared in a structured format, other 
times in an unstructured format and sometimes in both formats. One example of structured data 
was the Mission Tracking Matrix (MITAM) used by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
(OFDA). This spreadsheet allowed OFDA to validate and prioritize requests for assistance and 
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then assign to the appropriate force. Unstructured data included inputs from sources outside the 
task force such as from an NGO, or first responder, in the form or an email, phone call, meeting, 
etc. that contained pertinent information to the decision makers at the operational level. A 
combination of structured and unstructured data was a request for information in a format that 
had defined fields for specific information and along with free form fields that allowed the user 
to explain the situation and give details without the restriction of a formatted response. 
Tactical 
The tactical level of information sharing was limited to the Execute Phase. Tactical level 
information sharing included providing information that allowed organizations to organize and 
execute task together. An example was the sharing and management of emergency frequencies to 
ensure there was no conflict and so everyone had situational awareness of real time activities. 
The information sharing based on the level of support in Haiti matches well with the 
Indian Ocean relief effort five years prior (see Table 5.10). Many the processes and 
organizational structures changed little in those years. The technology platforms to perform 
procedures and the procedures had minimal changes, mostly to facilitate these relief operations. 
Table 5:10 Analysis of Data Types by Level of Support for the Haiti Earthquake 
Level of Support  Date Types and Magnitude Compared to Expected. 
 = as theoretically expected, ? = not as theoretically expected 
 Unstructured Data Structured & Unstructured 
Data  
Structured Data 
Strategic  High  None  Low 
Operational  Low  Low  High 





As predicted in the Chapter Two introduction, a task force was formed for the military’s 
disaster response. Named the Joint Task Force – Haiti , it was set up with six primary command 
functions and one specialized function, Medical. Descriptions of the activities and types of data 
shared by each command function follows: 
Personnel 
Personnel command functions operated in an information environment that favored 
structured data. This allowed the personnel staff to management personnel and resources. Most 
of the information was related to the personnel assigned to executing the mission. This 
information was sensitive, and in many cases classified to protect the privacy of the individual as 
well as the participating unit. 
Intelligence 
Intelligence information was unstructured and structured and as well as a mix. 
Intelligence was gathered from a plethora of sources and assimilated and analyzed regardless of 
the format. The aerial photos provided by both military and civilian aircraft and satellite systems 
were unstructured in the way they were “posted” but most of the partners already used a common 
data format to allow them to be displayed. The mapping data also was provided in a format such 
that the mapping application could read and properly display the maps. 
Operations 
The operations command function was primarily structured, and mixed data was part of 
the information sharing environment. For example, there was a pre-defined format for an 
Operations Order given to the subordinate units to perform their mission. This represents a 
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structured format, but the data itself can be unstructured. Fragmentary Orders were, on the other 
hand, very specific and followed a specific Message Text Format for the data that was entered. 
Logistics 
The logistics command function almost exclusively dealt with structured data. It was 
mostly concerned with size, quantity, location, costs, requirements of resources for the relief 
effort, all of which tended to be quantitative values. The World Food Program (WFP) was the 
Logistics Cluster lead. The WFP had databases which they updated about where, when and how 
best to deliver the aid that is essential. 
Plans 
Closely aligned with the operations command function, the planning command function 
favored more of a hybrid data information sharing environment. Current and future operations 
planning helped the planners to communicate the strategy into that operational plans that the 
tactical units executed. 
Communications 
Communications in many ways was similar to logistics in that all information had to be 
accurate to be effective. Emergency frequencies were managed to keep lines of communications 
opened to first responders. Communications had to be interoperable so that all partners could 
communicate. Even the data required for azimuths had to be accurately set up for satellite 
connectivity. As one can see in Table 5.11 Almost all of the data used by the Communications 











Regional Engagements  
Operational 
Tactical 
(U/S) Training objectives / databases 
(S) Airfield and Hospital studies 
(U/S) Training objectives / databases  
Phase I: 
Damage Assessments 
Food and Shelter estimates 




(U) Damage Assessments 
(U) IDP Reports, NGO reports, Hospital reports 
(U) MSR reports from military units, civil 
authorities, populace 
(S) Airfield and Hospital studies 
Phase II: 













((S) Inputs from participating partners, 
interagency and international 
(S) Force Deployment Document 
(S) Orders 
(S) Forecast 
(S) Daily reports 
(S) Hospital reports 
 (S) Mobile assets 
(S) Inventory 
(S) transportation reports 










Plan movement of supplies and 
personnel 
Current Ops Planning 
Future Operations Planning 
Operational (S) Inputs from participating partners, 
interagency and international 
(S) Force Deployment Document 
(S) Orders 
(S) Forecast 
(S) Daily Reports 
S) Hospital reports 
(S) Mobile assets 
(S) Inventory 
(S) transportation reports 
(S) DUB format 
(S) Orders 
(S) Op Plan 
(S) FUOPS plan 
Phase IV: 
Current Ops Planning 





Operational (S) Op Plan 
(S) FUOPS plan 
(S) Transition Plan 
(S) Forecast 
(S) Daily Reports 






Return to Home Station 
Operational (S) Transition Plan 
 
Partners 
For the Haiti earthquake foreign disaster response, partners came together to support a 
common goal of providing relief and saving lives. Even though the traditional role of the U.S. 
military is to provide such assistance with both manpower, equipment and material resources 
unless they are called upon to provide more immediate security responses. In the context of 
sharing information with partner internal organizations were the organizations with which the 
U.S. military normally does business. External organizations were the organizations that 
normally had no need to share information. Further details on specific partners follows. 
Internal Partners 
During the relief effort the U.S. military established the Joint Task Force – Haiti (JTF-
Haiti). It consisted of: 
➢ Joint Force Land Component Command 
➢ Joint Logistics Command 
➢ Joint Task Force – Port Opening 
➢ Joint Force Maritime Component Command 
➢ Air Force Maritime Component Command 
➢ Joint Force Special Operation Component Command 
These were all military organizations on the task force and information occurred on a 
regular basis through the Joint task Force – Haiti. Much of the information shared with these 
internal partners, was structured. In many cases, the data were quantifiable summaries to include 
information such as port operations as well as air field operations. This information was 
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invaluable in providing situational awareness and giving decision makers a better understanding 
in order to make informed decisions. 
Table 5.12 Data Type based on Type of Partner 





Internal = High 
External = Medium  
 (U/S) Training objectives / 
databases 






Food and Shelter 
estimates 
Main Supply Routes 
Exercises 
Area Assessments 
Internal = High 
External = High  
(U) Damage Assessments 
(U) IDP Reports, NGO 
reports, Hospital reports 
(U) MSR reports from 
military units, civil 
authorities, populace 
(U/S) Training objectives / 
databases 
(S) Airfield and Hospital 
studies 
Phase II: Damage 
Assessments 
Food and Shelter 
estimates 
Main Supply Routes 
Internal = High 
External = Low 
(S) Organize task force 
(S) Assign Units 






(S) Daily Updates 
(S) Plan movement of 
supplies and personnel 
(S) Mapping 











Internal = High 
External = High 
 
(S/U) Respond to RFIs 
(S/U) Respond to RFAs 
(S) Coordination of USAID 
Mission Tracking Matrix 
(S) Current Ops Planning 










Plan movement of 
supplies and personnel 
(S) Collect lessons learned 
(S) Mapping 
(S) Ariel and ground photos 
(U) Inputs from participating 
partners, interagency and 
international 




(S) Daily Reports 
S) Hospital reports 
(S) Mobile assets 
(S) Inventory,(S) 
transportation reports 
(S) DUB format 
(S) Orders 
Phase IV 







Internal = High 
External = Medium 
 
(S) Op Plan 
(S) FUOPS plan 
(S) Transition Plan 
(S) Forecast 
(S) Daily Reports 




Return to Home Station 
Internal = High 
External = Low 
 
(S) Transition Plan 
 
External Partners 
There were reportedly over 1,000 NGOs working with the UN Office of Coordination of 
Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) that participated in this relief effort. These organizations are 
the partners that were considered external. During Haiti, most of the information among these 
organizations was shared across all phases and command functions in unstructured data formats, 




Knowing more about the internal and external partners improved the explanatory power 
of the Phase variable. For internal partners, structured data was used primarily in the Respond, 
Transition, and Redeploy phases. The unstructured data tended to be shared with internal 
partners during the Prepare and Assess phases. However, for the external partners, structured 
data was shared primarily in the Execute phase with a low reliance on unstructured data the 
remainder of the time. 
There were other non-traditional technologies that emerged during the relief effort that 
played a critical role. In fact, they were primarily efforts by volunteers which received quite a bit 
of notice from the leveraging of Web 2.0 technologies to provide critical information. 
Within hours after the report of the Haiti earthquake, a new community of virtually 
connected volunteers affiliated with Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
consulting companies, private corporations, open source software proponents, academic/research 
institutions, NGOs, and even the Haitian diaspora community began applying new ICT 
applications to the earthquake response. "Web 2.0" social network media were used as a new 
means for crowdsourced data collection, information sharing, and collaboration. Within days, 
individuals from this community, with support from the U.S. State Department, worked with ICT 
companies to establish a SMS 4636 code for the free transmission of text message information to 
and from Haiti. Google adapted its suite of tools for applications to support the Haiti earthquake 
response and helped develop a Person Finder application to help find and connect persons in 
Haiti who could not be contacted. 
A nascent, virtual CrisisMappers network began utilizing an open source interactive 
mapping platform, known as Ushahidi (Swahili for “witness”), to gather, extract, and plot geo-
referenced data on a public domain website. Over the course of the disaster, Ushahidi and 
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volunteer translators received over 80,000 text messages; approximately 3,000 of these were 
used in some way during response activities. Other geo-referenced data were gleaned from 
Twitter, blogs, the news media, and humanitarian situation reports to provide fast turnaround 
situational awareness products, including imagery-based maps. The U.S. Coast Guard, the 22nd 
U.S. Marine Expeditionary Unit, and other first responders reported using these social media 
platforms to carry out their emergency assistance operations. Individuals from the USG, the UN, 
and some NGOs were also connected to this network. 
Chapter Summary 
The 2010 Haiti earthquake case offers insight into the way the U.S. military responded to 
this foreign disaster. A review of this case reveals similar patterns to what was discovered in the 
Indian Ocean tsunami event; however, there are some nuanced differences. For example, a slight 
shift to more unstructured data for all of the independent variables is evident. I close the chapter 
by answering the three research questions. 
➢ Research Question #1: What are the types of data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR 
events? 
For the Haiti Earthquake case, the U.S. military relied on technology platforms that featured 
structured data and unstructured. Structured data was shared with internal partners and often for 
strategic process support. Unstructured data, rather than being generated by the U.S. military was 
created by a network of volunteer responders and used by the U.S. military. 
➢ Research Question #2: What is the relative fit between the Task variable and the types of 
data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
The phases are the best predictor of the type of data that was shared. All the cells in the 
table were as predicted except for two cells. First, in the Transition phase which is Decision 
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Task. The theoretical expectation was that there would be a high percentage mix of structured 
and unstructured data; however, in this case, there was no mix of data with nearly a 100% 
reliance on structured data. This was probably because the Transition phase has more concern 
with internal organizations turning over their tasks to the external organizations. 
The second place where the case did not support the theory was during the Prepare phase. 
As a judgement task, it was expected that the use of structure data would be high. Instead, it 
included unstructured as well. Databases to track training objectives prior to and during 
exercises, scenario events to be injected to the exercise to help the training audience to meet their 
training requirements, and other databases and spreadsheets helped planners to execute exercises. 
Also, intelligence gathered data on airfield capacity to determine the type of aircraft that could 
land there, size of the tarmac and other airfield related information planners would need to plan 
missions. All data were structured. Information was also gathered and stored on things like 
hospitals, what capabilities they had, the number of beds, etc. 
➢ Research Question #3: Are there other factors, such as Process Support Level, Military 
Command and/or Partners, that provide a more robust explanation of the types of data 
shared during the activities of the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
The level of support does not seem to be a good indicator, except for the Strategic level. 
At the Strategic level unstructured information sharing allowed the partners to have an open 
forum allowing for the free flow of ideas and concepts. This facilitated the development of plans 
and policies. It also allowed for an unrestricted collaborative environment. 
Command level is a good predictor of logistics and communications sharing structured 
data since the information they dealt with is quantitative. However, intelligence and operations 
data was found to be a mix of data types and thus is not necessarily a good indicator for the type 
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of data that was shared. Plans were usually unstructured but may contained some quantitative 
data that was structured. Thus, I conclude that military command level is not better variable for 
the model then is the phases variable. 
Internal versus external partners with whom information was shared, alone is not a good 
predictor. However, when combined with the phase variable, the adapted model can help predict 
the type of data shared. For example, during Assess phase almost all data from external 
organizations was unstructured. Another example was found during the deploy phase where the 
internal organizations almost always dealt with structured data such as flight manifests and plans. 
Out of four independent variables that were explored, the Phases variable offers the greatest 
support for the TTF theory as modified and applied to HA/DR. 
The two humanitarian assistance/disaster relief case studies provide excellent examples 
of the technology platforms used for data during the 2004 Indian Oceans tsunami and the 2010 
Haiti earthquake foreign disaster response efforts of the U.S. military. To gain a broader 
perspective on the U.S. military’s pattern of data sharing during planning exercises and in other 
relief response efforts, the next chapter examines lessons learned and best practices from the 
Joint Lessons Learned Information System database. If consistent results are found in a broader 




JLLIS DATABASE LESSONS LEARNED 
The Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is a system designed to allow 
stakeholders to capture/document observations and best practices that stakeholders have 
identified as valuable information concerning lessons learned from crisis and steady state 
operations, events, and exercises. Information from these lessons learned often serves as the 
basis for establishing capability requirements where capability gaps exist. This database is 
available to all service commands, component commands and military organizations. JLLIS is a 
particularly valuable resource since it also includes entries by interagency organizations that 
interface with the military as well as those that may not. 
The JLLIS database has been around for over 20 years and therefore it provides an 
historical perspective. Many of the planned military exercises use JLLIS as a means for showing 
trends and identifying where training is needed to meet readiness requirements. JLLIS is also 
used to capture observations from real world operations to build meaningful training events and 
exercises. The contributions about issues go through a process which moves the JLLIS entry 
from an observation to an issue and then to a lesson learned. These issues can result in policy, 
procedures, tactics, funding, deployment of resources and other meaningful actions. 
I observed a good example of the lessons learned being used to shape an exercise, when I 
was a member of the Training Staff at AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany. A major command 
exercise was being planned for the AFRICOM headquarters and the early planning cycle was at 
a point where both major mission sets and training objectives were being discussed and 
documented. Contributions that came out of Operation Odyssey Dawn, an international military 
operation in Libya to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973, were used to 
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shape a major command exercise since the UN Security Council Resolution formed the basis for 
military intervention in the Libyan Civil War. A no-fly zone was established as part of this action 
and the resolution also authorized all means necessary, short of foreign occupation, to provide 
protection of civilians. The lessons learned included documented contributions from various 
present at this operation. The AFRICOM staff reviewed these contributions and selected the 
most significant ones to be addressed as part of the exercise and training objectives of an 
upcoming headquarters exercise. 
Another example I observed occurred when I was at Camp Smith, Hawaii, transitioning 
to my new job as the JLLIS Program Manager for the US Pacific Command. An observation was 
documented in JLLIS about how medical supplies were slow to getting to their destination 
during and after flooding in Bangladesh. Bangladesh is prone to flooding and the JLLIS 
observation suggested that emergency medical supplies be pre-positioned in the region for 
quicker response and that those supplies be updated in accordance with a pre-planned schedule to 
ensure their quality. This was escalated through the Joint Lessons Learned process as an issue. It 
went through various staffs at the command for review and concurrence and funding sources 
were identified. The Chief of Staff was briefed on the resolution proposed and approved the 
funding to provide that capability. 
JLLIS entries regarding information sharing date back to 1997. Over this period of time 
from 1997 to 2018 over 1,000 contributions/lessons learned have been captured regarding 
information sharing. Between the years 1997 and 2004 the number of entries averaged about 5.5 
per year. 
Starting in April 2004 (and more than six months before the Indian Ocean tsunami, 
President Bush talked about information sharing in context to National Security and Anti-
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terrorism. President Bush also commented that “We’ve got to share information on a real-time 
basis, so first responders and police chiefs can move as quickly as possible.” He also commented 
that “We're charged with the security of the country, first responders are charged with the 
security of the country, and if we can't share information between vital agencies, we're not going 
to be able to do our job.” (Bush, 2004). Some of the points he makes apply across other missions, 
such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, where there are interagency as well as 
coalition partners and where sharing information is vital is in working together toward a common 
goal. (https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/04/20040420-2.html). 
It was late in that same year that the Indian Ocean Tsunami occurred, which impacted an 
entire region. After that in 2005, the number of entries jumped by a factor of five from 9 to 48, 
reflecting an increase in documenting the need for information sharing and the ways and means 
to share it. This is important because the included details on a wide variety of stakeholders from 
a wide variety of agencies, DoD and government, that traditionally would not share information 
except in extreme instances where time is critical as in the coordination of resources, capabilities, 
and manpower, needed to provide relief as quickly as possible. 
Another noticeable spike was several years following the Haiti earthquake, when another 
disaster that required a multinational and inter-agency response (as well as local, non-
governmental, and international organizations) was necessary. This was necessary to conduct 
relief operations in the most efficient way, to achieve success, and leverage the capabilities these 
various organizations contributed as part of the relief operations. 
There were multiple factors within the JLLIS database coded for analysis during this 
research. These factors included the period of time the contributions were identified and recorded 
in JLLIS, the phases of disaster response that were described (this included the preparation phase 
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prior to an event even occurring), the functional organizations that the lesson learned impacted, 
whether the data/information shared was structured or unstructured, and whether the 
data/information was shared with internal or external partners. The contributions/lessons learned 
selected from the JLLIS database were chosen based on whether they identified information 
sharing as an observation, provided discussion of the observation or described the resolution of 
the observation as an issue, and the lesson learned. 
Phases of HA/DR Operations 
The focus of this study is on the data being shared and in particular whether that data is 
structured or unstructured during different phases of a disaster relief. In this section, I compare 
the phases to data type, to identify any patterns. 
Phase 0, Prepare 
This phase is dominated by unstructured data. The Prepare phase reflects a lot of 
unstructured information sharing allowing for open communications, collaboration and planning 
among the stakeholders. A higher proportion of unstructured data makes sense in this phase, 
since it can include planning a multinational exercise or preparing for a port visit or some other 
type of regional security engagement event with internal partners in real time. The heavy reliance 





Figure 6.1: Data Type Used in Prepare Phase 
Phase I, Assess 
During the Assess phase there is more of a balance in the JLLIS lessons learned between 
structured and unstructured data being identified for information sharing. Information comes in 
from non-traditional sources and is usually unstructured, while the structured sources data come 
from more traditional sources. An example is USAID’s MITAM, a document which tends to 
provide structured data more than unstructured data. The finding that there is a slightly heavier 



















Figure 6.2: Data Type Used in Respond Phase 
Phase II, Respond 
Structured data dominates during the Deploy phase. The data associated with this phase 
are more exact and more quantifiable. The data from the Lessons Learned in the JLLIS database 
tend to be most associated with personnel movements as well as material, supplies, food, water 
and medical supplies to the right people at the right time. Figure 6.3 shows a slight reliance on 
structured data for this response phase, which fits the prediction made in Chapter Two. 
 
Figure 6.3: Data Type Used in Deploy Phase 
Phase III, Execute 
The Execute phase results show a dominance of unstructured data that is shared with 
multiple organizations. During the execute phase, it is predicted that there would be a balance of  
unstructured and structured since this phase pulls in from all the military command staffs. As 
shown in Figure 6.4, this expectation was accurate. 
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Figure 6.4: Data Type Used in Execute Phase 
Phase IV, Transition 
Unstructured data seems to be slightly more prominent in this phase. In many cases, the 
transition phase hands responsibilities back to external partners with whom the U.S. military 
infrequently shared data. This situation would suggest less commonly defined data elements and 
therefore less structured data. Therefore, the expectation would be for more unstructured data 
sharing. Evidence from the JLLIS lessons learns supports this expectation. 
 
Figure 6.5: Data Type Used in Transition Phase 












Very much like the Deploy phase and for the same reasons, the Redeploy phase is 
dominated by structured data. The data associated with this phase, such as personnel movements 
and well as material and equipment movement returning to home stations, are more exact and 
more quantifiable. Based on this, it was predicted that there would be greater use of structured 
data during the Redeploy phase. As shown in Figure 6.6, the details in the JLLIS lessons learned 
contributions support this expectation. 
 
Figure 6.6: Data Type Used in Redeploy Phase 
Figure 6.7 compares the patterns for data sharing in the JLLIS cases across the six phases 
of foreign disaster responses. Phase 0, the Prepare phase, reflects the highest reliance on 
unstructured information sharing. According to the authors submitting the JLLIS lessons learned, 
this fosters open communications, collaboration and planning among the stakeholders in contrast 
to the prediction of structured data from the adapted TTF framework. At the other end of the 
spectrum (literally and from a theoretical prediction framework) is the Redeployment phase 
where military units use primarily structured data to return to their home organizations and to 
normal operations. This finding conforms with predictions. 
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Figure 6.7: Summary of Data Types Across All Phases 
As noted in the discussion of each phase, the JLLIS data did not fit the TTF Theory as 
well as the findings from both HA/DR case studies. Part of the reason for this may have been 
that the broad perspective about information sharing provided by the JLLIS lessons learned 
reflects not only contributions from the Indian Ocean tsunami and the Haiti earthquake but also 
other federal government organization and U.S. military activities that are included in exercises 
and crisis action events as well as steady state events. 
Table 6.1 uses the adapted task-technology fit framework to analyze the relationship 
between the five task phases and the types of data that were being shared in the JLLIS lessons 
learned. Reviewing this type, we can see that the practices align with theoretical predictions for 
many of the cells. However, there are cells in which the predictions could not be confirmed.  
Analyzing the JLLIS lessons learned contributions as a group, cells for the simple tasks 
(which were equivalent to the Assess phase) reported data sharing in a way that were not 
predicted. Overall, the JLLIS data reported greater use of unstructured data.  For the decision 
tasks in the Transition phase, it would be necessary to combine real time data with the data that 
was already available via structured sources. Yet the JLLIS cases do not specifically reference 











featured described more structured data and less unstructured data sharing. These findings, 
however, may not be accurate since I did not have control over the narrative in the lessons 
learned. It may be possible that structured and/or unstructured data were shared, but the JLLIS 
lessons learned authors neglected to include this information. This is a threat to the validity of 
the findings in this chapter that was out of the control of this analysis. However, the sensitivity of 
the findings overall are not thought to be significantly challenged. 
 
 
Table 6.1 Comparison of Data Type by Task/Phase 
Phases & (theory-based 
Task Types) 
Date Types and Magnitude Compared to Expected. 
 = as theoretically expected, ? = not as theoretically expected 
 Unstructured Data Structured & 
Unstructured Data 
Structured Data  
I Assess (Simple) ? High  None ? Medium 
II Respond 







V Transition (Decision)  Low ? None  High 
0 Prepare (Judgement)  High  None ?Low 




Process Support Level 
If the military is asked to assist in an HA/DR event, it can participate at the tactical level, 
operational, or strategic level. More times than not, the JLLIS database cases suggest a 
combination of all three, with the primary process support level determine by the military’s role. 
Strategic 
Unstructured data stood out as the Strategic level of support data type. This makes sense 
since strategic level support often times also involves strategic messaging. Unstructured data 
allows many avenues to get information out to the public for messaging and communications. 
The use of unstructured data also allows strategic planners and leadership to communication and 
collaborate in an open unrestricted environment. 
Operational 
The Operational level showed approximately a 40-50-10 distribution of structured, 
unstructured, and both data types. What was expected was a higher use of structured data. The 
analysis still shows above average use of structured data.  The operational support level covers a 
broad spectrum of activities and a mix such is shown here is not unreasonable. 
Tactical 
The Tactical support level also suggest a roughly 40-50-10 distribution of Structured, 
unstructured, and both data types. This combination is as predicted since the personnel 




Figure 6.8: Data Type across Process Levels 
When reviewing the lessons learned in the JLLIS database, the strategic process support 
levels used primarily unstructured data as expected. The tactical support level relied a mix of 
structured and unstructured data technology platforms. This also supports the predictions from 
Chapter Two. However, the operational process support level is expected to have the highest 
reliance on structured data based on training exercises that assist in the planning and 
development of data sharing platforms. In this respect, the JLLIS data analysis shows more 
reliance on unstructured data than would be expected. 
One possible explanation for this is that this data source includes cases from a longer 
time period and especially those that are more current than the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The 
introduction and widespread adoption of unstructured data platforms for sharing data by U.S. 
organizations is consistent with the examples given above about the emphasis placed on this type 
of data for homeland security purposes. So, the longitudinal nature of the JLLIS data is likely 
















noted above, the material included in the contributions was not required to report on utilization 
of structured and/or unstructured data by the U.S. military or its partners. 
Military Command 
Almost all command staffs are build with a functional reponsibility. The staffs name 
reflect the area of expertise and their functional role. The accountability of the six command 
levels included in this analysis is based on varying responsibilities which are described next.  
Personnel 
For the Personnel command, I would have expected more structured data because the 
type of data is usually well defined. Yet as Figure 6.9 suggests, this was not the case. 
 
Figure 6.9: Data Types Used by Personnel Staff 
Intelligence 
Intelligence data comes from many and varied sources in many types of formats many of 
which are unstructured. This data has to be analyzed and considered in the broader context to 
appreciate its value. Analyzing the JLLIS lessons learned contributions, the majority of the data 









Figure 6.10: Data Types Used by Intelligence Staff 
 
Operations 
The data used by Operations comes in the form of both structured and unstructured. 
Figure 6.11 shows unstructured data at 55%, which is not that much higher than structured data. 
This makes sense because personnel performing the operations function would benefit from data 
delivered to them more quickly, which is the primary advantage of unstructured data. 
 















Logistics activities, as suggested throughout this study, benefits from the use of 
structured data. The finding in the JLLIS data base also supports this prediction (see Figure 
6.12). A heavy reliance on structured data makes sense since quantifiable data is often shared to 
coordinate the workforce that will be deployed and the equipment they will use. 
 
Figure 6.12: Data Types Used by Logistics Staff 
Plans 
Unlike Logistics, the Plans command is dominated by unstructured data and for good 
reason. Unstructured data for information sharing, allows for open communications, 
collaboration and planning among the stakeholders without putting unnecessary restrictions that 
are common to structured data technology platforms. As shown in Figure 6.13, 78% of all data 








Figure 6.13: Data Types Used by Plans Staff 
 
Communications 
Communications data sharing in the JLLIS observations also has a bit of a disconnect. 
Because of the technical nature of communication activities, one would think that there would be 
more structured than unstructured data. Yet, the use of unstructured data was slightly more than 
half. One potential contributing factor for this finding is that the training exercises in Phase 0 
were included in the database. As described above, the training exercises had a higher than 









Figure 6.14: Data Types Used by Communication Staff 
Reviewing the patterns found in the JLLIS lessons learned contributions, across all six 
military commands, the analytical conclusion is that all commands had a stronger tendency 
toward unstructured data with the exception of the Logistics command. This finding makes sense 
because logistics data usually deals in numeric values, including number of units, sizes and 
shapes, weights, capacity and other numeric values. The Logistics function was included in at 
least 20% of the other functional areas so the level of unstructured data reported in Figure 6.15 























Figure 6.15: Summary of Data Types Across Staffs 
Partners 
The Partners variable considered are both internal and external partners participating 
together as part of a disaster relief effort. Partners can come from a variety of organizations, 
some military, governmental, non-governmental, international, regional/local, and so on. 
Internal 
Internal partners are federal organizations with whom the U.S. military organizations 
share information. As can be seen in figur3 6.16 the JLLIS contributions documented the use of 
unstructured data at a rate of 58% and structured data 36%. This finding is as expected since 
internal organizations are common partners with the U.S. military. For the majority of internal 
partners, they have already been vetted and have access to structured data technology platforms. 
The sharing of unstructured data would also fall within the boundaries of information that was 
authorized to be shared during the access vetting process. 
 









External partners are organizations that typically do not work with the U.S. military and 
not a part of the larger federal organization structure. Unstructured data was reported at a rate of 
64% and structured data 28% (see Figure 6.17). When compared to internal partners, it makes 
sense that there is more unstructured data because data elements are not always defined or the 
same between disparate organizations. 
 
Figure 6.17: Data Types Used with External Partners 
Comparing the internal and external partners and the type of data, Figure 6.18 shows that 
the use of structured data was favored with external partners. However, there was not that much 
different between external and internal partners and data sharing. This finding is slightly 
different than what was found in the two case studies and also different from what was predicted 
in the literature review. Similar to the explanation that was offered above, the different patterns 
are thought to be reflective of the longitudinal data and presence of data that are more recent than 









Figure 6.18: Summary of Data Types Across Internal/External Partners 
As much as 80% of the world’s data is unstructured (www.netowl.com, Aug 17). Almost 
without exception all the contributions in the JLLIS lessons learned database that were used for 
this analysis, reflected a higher reliance on unstructured data over structured data. Seldom, 
however, did the mix between structured and unstructured data achieve the 80% rate reported by 
netowl. This research provides a more in depth look at the various factors identified to if which 
factors most impact the use of structured or unstructured data based on the technology platforms 
supporting them. 
Entries for information sharing increased by a factor of five after the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami. Within this number, the volume of structured data increased to about 30%. Compare 
this to three years before that, when it was 15% lower. Also, there was a two-fold increase in 
structured data after Haiti earthquake. There seemed to be a gradual increase in unstructured data 




















Figure 6.21: Structured Data vs Unstructured Data over Years 
The researcher more closely examined the same information for the period of time 2005-
2010, to see if there were any identifiable trends during this period of time. Following that, the 
focus turned to the period of time 2010 to the present, the years following the Haiti Earthquake 
to once again determine if there are any noticeable trends. As shown in the longitudinal bar 
graph, there are no clear patterns except for the conclusion that both structured and unstructured 
data sharing has consistently occurred over time with no real dominance of one type over 
another. Further, the trajectory of neither data type suggests a shift in the type of data that will 
primarily be shared in the future. Finally, it is surprising that the combination approach for 
sharing data peaked in the 2002-2005 time period, likely in part to the emphasis placed on this by 
President Bush as a means for consolidating and coordinating homeland security efforts. 
However, the focus on internal organization cooperation has not declined as much as the most 



































































































In this chapter, a primarily quantitative data source was evaluated. The JLLIS database 
provided a wealth of lessons learned contributions that spanned a much longer time period than 
did the individual Indian Ocean tsunami and Haiti earthquake HA/DR cases. The findings from 
this chapter allow for triangulation of the findings from the qualitative case data to the 
quantitative results from the JLLIS cases. Answer to the three research questions featured in my 
analysis using only the JLLIS data are provided below. 
➢ Research Question #1: What are the types of data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR 
events? 
Using the time period from 1997-2018, the steady transition to unstructured data that 
would be expected based on technology advancements that benefitted not only the U.S. military 
but people and organizations around the world was not consistent. Clearly, the JLLIS 
contributions emphasize unstructured data. However, they also suggest a pairing of that data with 
structured data. Another surprising find was that the combination approach of sharing data across 
both types of technology platforms has been and continues to be a relatively small proportion 
and with no clear longitudinal trajectory. 
➢ Research Question #2: What is the relative fit between the Task variable and the types of 
data shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
Similar to the overall analytical conclusions that were reached in the Indian Ocean 
tsunami and the Haiti earthquake case, and as predicted by the adapted Task Technology Fit 
theory, there are patterns suggesting data sharing preferences. However, considering the 15 cells 
predicted by the theory, there is an increase in the number of cells that do not fulfill the theory’s 
prediction using the JLLIS data. The use of unstructured and structured data for the Assess phase 
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was not as predicted since there was a higher reliance on unstructured data than would be 
expected and only a medium reliance on structured data. The Execute phase did have a high 
reliance on structured data but a surprisingly low reliance on unstructured data. Finally, for the 
Prepare phase, the use of structured data was low. This is perhaps the most surprising finding 
from the more than 1,000 cases since the preparation phase is when the U.S. military has the 
highest level of control. One possible explanation for this is that, over time, the training exercises 
have evolved to include more international partners slightly reducing the ability (and 
willingness) to share technology platforms hosting structured data. 
➢ Research Question #3: Are there other factors, such as Process Support Level, Military 
Command and/or Partners, that provide a more robust explanation of the types of data 
shared during the activities of the U.S. military in HA/DR events? 
Similar to the findings in the two case study chapters, the presence of internal and 
external partners can increase the explanatory power of the disaster response phases variable. 
With regard to the other independent variables that were included in the analysis for the testing 
of alternate explanations, the evidence does not suggest any enhancement based on the process 
support level or military command. 
More direct comparisons of the findings from the three substantive case chapters and 
across time are the topic for the next chapter. After discussion of the comparative findings, I 
describe the robustness of the adapted task technology fit theory and make modest suggestions 
for theoretical improvements. Following that, I consider the practical implications of this study 
and offer recommendations to improve practice as well as future research to overcome some 





Discussion and Theoretical and Practical Implications 
Although literally half a world apart two natural disasters, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 
2004/2005 and the Haiti earthquake in 2010, provide an important source of case study data for 
analyzing the U.S. military’s response to foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
activities. Supplementing the qualitative case data are quantitative data derived from the U.S. 
governments’ Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) database. Drawing from more 
than 1,000 lessons learned, the JLLIS material provides insights into the trajectory of the 
relationship between task and technology for more than 20 years. Leveraging the mix of data 
provided by these multiple data sources allows us to answer the primary research question: 
What is the best way to share critical information between diverse organizations 
who partner with the U.S. military in HA/DR efforts? 
This chapter makes conclusions about whether information sharing is better served by 
data that is unstructured, such as that found in social media, or by more traditional structured 
data, such as that which is found in lists and databases. I aggregate the findings from the three 
empirical chapters to draw overarching conclusions about how different types of data are shared 
and how this is influenced by four independent variables (phase, process support level, military 
command and partners). This empirical analysis constitutes both a deductive and an inductive 
test of an adaptation of Zigurs & Buckland’s (1998) Task and Technology Fit Theory (TTF). 
This theory was originally designed to explain the fit between task and technology in the setting 
of a single corporation. I adapted the theory to apply and test on HA/DR events featuring internal 
and external partners drawn from the entire range of organizational sectors. The partners also 
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include individuals, such as citizens in the disaster are who were not members of any 
organization but were part of the HA/DR response. 
For the deductive test of TTF theory, the key independent variable of interest is the tasks 
associated with an HA/DR event. The tasks are analyzed during six typical disaster response 
phases to assess the correlation between the tasks in each phase and type of data shared. For the 
inductive test of the TTF theory, the three remaining independent variables (process support 
level, military command, and partners) are tested to see if they provide a more robust explanation 
of the utilization and sharing of structured, unstructured and/or a mix of these two types of data. 
By comparing the findings from each of the three analytical chapters across the deductive 
and inductive theory tests, the analysis identifies similarities that confirm the theoretical 
relevance of task and technology fit theory when to a multi-organization HA/DR event. Nuanced 
differences in the findings across the empirical three chapters are explored now to see if: 1) they 
are idiosyncratic to the contextual setting of the disaster response efforts, 2) if they challenge the 
adaptability of the TTF theory to HA/DR versus strict application to an autonomous corporation, 
3) if they suggest enhancements to TTF theory to encompass all organization types, or 4) if they 
introduce challenges to the robustness and generalizability of the extant theory. 
To determine theoretical robustness and generalizability, the first section of this chapter 
is organized by the three research questions introduced in Chapter One to determine if TTF can 
be adapted to HA/DR events. The second section discusses what this dissertation’s empirical 
findings mean in terms of trends identified and how to better fit task and technology in real 
world HA/DR settings in which the U.S. military is a first responder. The second section also 
discusses how these findings are the same as, or different from, the corporate setting of a single 
firm with no external partners for collaboration on tasks. This section also describes threats to 
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validity that could be overcome in a future research agenda. The final section summarizes the 
conclusions from this research, suggests implications of this research for HA/DR responses by 
the U.S. military and makes recommendations to enhance current practices. 
Findings for an Adapted TTF Theory 
When the U.S. military is involved in a foreign HA/DR event, the organization must 
share information internally between functional units within the military command structure, 
between commands, between services, between other U.S. federal organization, between other 
foreign militaries, between non-governmental and international organizations and with residents 
of the foreign country. Some of the data that is shared is structured, which enables critical data to 
be passed between various systems, provided partners in the disaster relief effort have similar 
technology platforms and security clearance for data access. Some of the data that is shared is 
unstructured, allowing the data to be more descriptive in real time, yet open to interpretation. 
Two-way sharing of both types of data are essential for the U.S. military’s disaster relief 
activities. Unstructured data coming in from responders with “boots on the ground”, or from 
satellite images, can help planners and decision makers piece together a common picture of the 
current operations. Structured data used for logistics, deployment and redeployment of forces are 
essential for calculating payloads, monitoring and managing resources, and planning activities. 
Research Questions #1 and #2 allow us to assess the transferability of the theories related 
to the importance of task and technology fit. Table 7.1 recaps the analytical findings regarding 
the types of data used from each of the three substantive chapters to answer Research Question 
#1: What are the types of data being shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR events? The 
similarity across the columns confirms the importance of technology platforms for structured and 
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unstructured data. In addition, comparing the top of the table with the bottom of the table, there 
is evidence that combination approaches were critical in the JLLIS lessons learned contributions. 
The left column of Table 7.1 provides the tasks in which the different data types were 
shared to answer Research Question #2: What is the relative fit between the task variables and 
the type of data that was shared by the U.S. military in HA/DR events? There is sharing of both 
structured and unstructured data across all three cases; however, as described below, the 
magnitude of use differs, suggesting that trajectories for data sharing are changing over time. 
Table 7.1 Data Types in the HA/DR Cases 
Data Phase Indian Ocean 
Tsunami 
Haiti Earthquake JLLIS 
Structured Data 
0. Prepare Exercise Planning 
tool 
Country Studies 
Exercise Planning tool 
Country Studies 
Exercise planning execution, 
engagement activities, 
studies 
I. Assess Assessment Reports Assessment Reports Damage reports/causalities 






Admin tasks related to 
deploying responders 
III. Execute MITAM 
RFA/RFI/IDP 
Status 
MITAM  Information to plan and 
conduct operations 
IV. Transition Transition Metrics Transition Metrics Information to transition 
activities to relief 
organizations 
V. Redeploy Cargo manifests 
PAX Manifest 
Orders 
Cargo manifests Admin tasks related to re-
deploying responders 
Unstructured Data 




Exercise planning execution, 
engagement activities, 
studies 







Admin tasks related to 
deploying responders 
II. Deploy Email Email  Information required to plan 
and conduct operations 
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Information to transition 
activities to relief 
organizations 








Admin tasks related to re-
deploying responders 








As we can see in Table 7.1, there are very similar patterns for the use of technology 
platforms that support structured data across all three cases. Considering the unstructured data, 
the biggest difference is found by looking at the Indian Ocean case, where the RFA/RFI status 
was communicated via structured data platforms. By comparison, in the 2010 response to the 
Haiti earthquake, the RFA/RFI status reports were done via unstructured data technologies. In 
addition, even though structured data continued to be shared and used, for the Haiti case the 
lion’s share of unstructured data was in the form of social media use because of the popularity 
and increased availability of these technology platforms. Another notable finding from Table 7.1 
is that the JLLIS lessons learned contributions highlight a higher mix of structured and 
unstructured data for every data phase. Provided below are specific comparative observations 
about the fit between tasks and technology for each of the six phases. 
Phase 0 – Prepare 
The data characteristics of the first phase known as the Prepare phase, depend a lot on 
what information is being shared. When using the labels from the TTF theory, the activities in 
the Prepare phase are Judgment tasks. This phase consistently had an emphasis on information 
sharing, such as information need for planning the exercises, including logistics to support and 
exercise control over the group that runs/manages the exercises as well as the training audience. 
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Most all the training tools used in the Joint Exercise Life Cycle are kept in databases for support 
of the exercise execution. Also, used is interactive applications (IBM Workplace and Intelligent) 
for sharing/posting documents, and other media for use in planning. 
Phase I - Assess 
Analysis of the second phase of an operation, Assess, reveals that a lot of data is collected 
from many different sources and the information must be assimilated and processed within some 
pre-established structure to make it actionable. These kinds of activities represent a Simple task 
characteristic. There are some nuanced differences between the two disaster relief case studies 
during the Assess phase. To a large extent data including satellite imagery was generated by 
many different organizations and shared via social media applications during the Haiti 
earthquake. This was different from the Indian Ocean tsunami assessments which were made 
using photos created by the U.S. Navy P-3 aircraft and compared to other visual and narrative 
data shared by humanitarian and military organizations on the ground. 
Phase II – Deploy 
Problem Tasks characterized the Phase II Deploy. Once the assessment was completed, 
decisions were made for manpower and resource movement to the affected area. Most of the data 
used in this phase was predominately shared in structured format. The information needed to be 
processed and provided in a consistent format, so it could be easily used and shared in a timely 
manner with the U.S. military’s partners. 
Phase III – Execute 
Phase III which is the Execute phase, has the task characteristics of a Fuzzy task. The 
reason is because it tends to involve Requests for Assistance or Request for Information at both 
the tactical and operational support levels. The technology platforms best suited to providing this 
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information feature structured data, such as the USAID Mission Tracking Matrix does. The data 
can be exported and analyzed since they are already in a structured format. During this phase, 
assessments continued to be made available to the relief organization but tended to taper off at 
the end of the operation. This information was used to help decision makers evaluate when the 
Transition phase can start further supporting the expectation of Fuzzy task characteristics. 
However, a mix of data was present as well. Media and non-profit organizations made 
extensive use of Twitter and Facebook to provide their audience on the relief efforts. Even 
though these activities do not directly impact the U.S. military’s operation, the unstructured data 
used as public relations tools by all partner organizations were at the strategic support level. 
Phase IV – Transition 
Planning and coordination was done during Transition phase for the smooth, orderly 
transition of military resources and manpower to home stations as well as the transfer of the 
military’s activities to the humanitarian organizations. The data shared in this phase is structured 
as would be predicted for Decision tasks. Structured data is paramount since it provides 
accountability for equipment and manpower. The structured data is also needed to help ensure 
that the capacity and capability that is being removed from the disaster relief efforts are being 
replaced during the transition allowing the relief organizations to continue their mission. 
Phase V – Redeploy 
The activities during the Redeploy phase are very similar to the Transition phase, with a 
big exception. The tasks are primarily problem solving since personnel and equipment may be 
returned to their home stations or they may be needed to bolster the mission of the U.S. military 
in other parts of the world. Information sharing among the internal military was necessary to 
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coordinate the airlift requirements to support the redeployment, supporting the prediction of the 
type of data that would be shared for a problem task. 
To answer Research Question #2, the findings from the TTF Theory table in each of the 
empirical chapters has been consolidated. The Indian Ocean tsunami and the Haiti earthquake 
had many of the tasks and in the same format. In the five-year period that separated these two 
events, the basic tasks and the data format used to share the data as reported in the JLLIS lessons 
learned contributions were very much the same. Using the data from these three sources, the 
adapted TTF framework correlated very well with the theoretical TTF framework. The only 
exception was found in a couple of the results from the JLLIS analysis. There was low 
correlation between the Fuzzy Task (Execute Phase) and the utilization of the technology 
platforms for structured data sharing. This may be because JLLIS covered a wider time span and 
had create diversity in the contributions and the report of data sharing by types than just HA/DR 
activities and specific foreign disaster response efforts. The other task that did not correlate as 
well was the Simple Task (Assess Phase). The empirical analysis found that more data comes 
from both unstructured and structed data sources than what the TTF theory designed for a single 
corporation would predict. Similar to the Fuzzy Task exception, this may be because of the 
enlarged timeframe, broader range of information sharing and the multiple external partners in 
the JLLIS contributions. 
The table that consolidates the findings is found in Table 7.2. Two case study results 
along with the findings pulled from the JLLIS database. The TTF theory-based task types and the 
adapted TTF or phases are in bold print in each of the five cells of the left most column. Then 
within each of the cells of the results of the Indian Ocean case study, the Haiti Earthquake and 
JLLIS are further broken down. The next three columns represent the Communications Support 
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Dimension as Unstructured Data, the Information Processing Dimension as Structure Data, the 
Process Structuring Dimension represents both. The values in the table, high, medium, low, have 
been transferred from the Zigurs and Buckland’s table to the adapted TTF table as the expected 
value. After examining the data, if the expected value was the same it was marked by a check 
indicating a good fit for that part of the theoretical framework and if not it was marked with a 
question mark. The model seemed to fit pretty well given all my seven of the 45 possibilities. 
The one noticeable exception was the unstructured data. For the Indian Ocean case and JLLIS, 
this might be expected since use of unstructured data in an HA/DR was still developing in its 
technology and its availability. Use of structured data is still critical to information sharing needs 
during an HA/DR, but the contributions of unstructured data is growing, but does not play as big 
a role as expected during the Execute phase.     
7.2 Phases/TTF Task Types vs Data Type and Expect Results 
Phases & (theory-based Task Types) Date Types and Magnitude Compared to Expected.  






Simple Task=Assess Phase 
Ch. 4: Indian Ocean 
Ch. 5: Haiti 














Ch. 4: Indian Ocean 
Ch. 5: Haiti 
Ch. 6: JLLIS 
 










 High  
Decision Task=Transition Phase 
Ch. 4: Indian Ocean 
Ch. 5: Haiti 
Ch. 6: JLLIS 
 
 Low 
 Low  









Judgement Task=Prepare Phase 
Ch. 4: Indian Ocean 
Ch. 5: Haiti 













Fuzzy Task=Execute Phase    
141 
 
Ch. 4: Indian Ocean 
Ch. 5: Haiti 
Ch. 6: JLLIS 










An important finding from this analysis is that unstructured data, as used in social media, 
is a good fit for Fuzzy Tasks for getting data/information to planners, so they can assess the 
information and then make informed decisions. In addition, the public relations function is made 
easier through Facebook and Twitter feeds. 
The Indian Ocean Tsunami Relief effort took place in December 2004. Social media was 
not as big then but web technologies such as Lotus Sametime by IBM, used by the Navy 
Collaboration at Sea Program was referred to as a “poor man’s video teleconference” that could 
share information in an unstructured format. It provided video/audio, chat, file sharing and other 
such collaborative capabilities. Another Web 2.0 technology that used was IBM Workplace. It 
enabled us to empower responsible staffs with the ability to build the information within their 
Workplace that would best suit them, and their audience needs. 
The Haiti earthquake was five years later, and social media had grown by leaps and 
bounds. Even the All Partners Access Network was labeled a social networking site. They used 
and still use a collaborative platform called Telligent which had very similar capabilities as IBM 
Team Workplace. During the Haiti Relief operation, the All Partners Access Network also used 
Adobe’s Connect. (The Asia-Pacific Area Network originally introduced this as a product 
developed by Macromedia, known as Macromedia Breeze). 
Further support for this finding is found in two more recent examples of the use of social 
media not related to these case studies. The first example pertains to the 2011 Japan tsunami and 
what the U.S. Embassy personnel in Japan did prior to the tsunami during the Preparation phase. 
The U.S. Embassy reached out to all U.S. citizens in the country and set them up with Twitter 
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accounts. When disaster eventually struck, the U.S. citizens were contacted by Twitter. This is a 
great use of unstructured data for relief operations since it shares data directly with individuals. 
A tweet received directly from the U.S. Embassy assured U.S. citizens that the information was 
legitimate. The task characteristic was simple and can easily be transferred to other settings and 
partners. The Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii has a similar system for using phone systems 
to warn/inform citizens if there is a tsunami approaching the Islands. Further, the U.S. State 
Department now offers the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) to allow U.S. citizens 
and nationals living abroad to register their plans with the nearest U.S. Embassy or Consulate. 
The second example of social media use becoming more vital also falls in the Preparation 
phase. The All Partners Access Network (APAN) has come up with an ingenious way to use 
blogs during disaster exercises. Describing events on the blog during the disaster exercise helps 
the training audience (often including not just the U.S. military, but multinational partners) to 
meet their training requirements. These blog posts come directly from the Joint Mission Essential 
Task List which is a structured technology platform but shared with the training audience via an 
unstructured platform. 
Given these two examples, I conclude that unstructured data’s biggest relevancy is to 
Fuzzy Tasks and it remains a good fit as such. However, the caveat is the unstructured data is 
being leveraged in creative ways to impact the Preparation phase as well. 
This research explored three other factors that may also help to determine which 
technology platforms for data sharing that are most useful. Research question #3: “Are there 
other factors that provide a more robust explanation of the data sharing activities of the U.S. 
military in HA/DR events?” is used to analyze these factors. 
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The process support level of the various disaster response tasks provided by the U.S. 
military was analyzed to determine if the selection of structured or unstructured data was 
predicted by whether the information was strategic, operational or tactical in nature. Using these 
three categories, there were no consistent patterns that could predict the technology platform for 
data sharing that were more robust than the explanations offered by knowing the phase of the 
disaster response. This conclusion suggests that there is collinearity between the process support 
level and the phases of disaster response making analysis of two distinct variables unnecessary. 
When analyzing the tasks performed based on the military command with primary 
responsibility for the task, predictable patterns were not identified either. This may be due, in 
part, to the fact that the U.S. military was not the lead responding agency, so it had to provide 
resources based on gaps in resources for the foreign country at which the disaster occurred. 
Further, as discussed in the analysis of the partner variable, each event had noticeable differences 
in the internal and external partners. This meant that the relief activities provided by the U.S. 
military varied dramatically making certain commands more or less active for each case. 
Adding consideration of whether the partners were internal partners within the U.S. 
government structure or external organizations who were also part of the disaster relief efforts 
improved the explanation of the choice of sharing structured data, unstructured data or a mix of 
the two. When internal partners were involved with the U.S. military in the disaster relief effort, 
there was generally a greater reliance on the sharing of structured data. This is reasonable since 
the technology platforms of the federal government are more likely to be compatible. Additional, 
security vetting considerations in real time were not necessary since the partners had regularized 
working relationships and the clearance levels were established in advance. 
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For data sharing with external partners, it was easier if the partners had collaborated 
previously, such as in exercises or prior HA/DR efforts. One of the premier systems used to 
share information in these two events was the Asia-Pacific Area Network, during the Indian 
Ocean Tsunami relief effort, and later as the All Partners Access Network, during the Haiti 
Earthquake. This network supported the PACOM commander’s regional security objectives. 
Although it was available to and used by the worldwide community, its focus was regional, 
which happens to be the largest area of responsibility among commands around the world. The 
networks supported the Department of Defense as an unclassified information sharing solution to 
facilitate collaboration and coordination with non-traditional actors outside the military’s 
communications domains. The reasons for this are thought to be similar to the reasons given for 
data sharing with internal partners. 
However, all the of data analytic findings in the empirical chapters suggest that when 
there is more diversity in the range of external partners, and when individuals and community 
groups on the ground are engaged in data sharing with the U.S. military, the data sharing tends to 
make greater use of unstructured data via publicly available platforms that better communicate 
conditions in real time. A distinct advantage of this approach is that it obviates the need for any 
kind of security clearance and provides the potential for important updates to be shared and re-
posted/shared to a wider range of users. Table 7.2 compares the types of relief organizations 
participating in relief operations noted in the descriptions in the empirical chapters.  
Social media has become a valuable resource that can used during an HA/DR event. In 
the future, social media may have an increasing role especially in the early stages of a relief 
operation. It made an impact in several areas including providing a platform for raising relief 
funds, getting initial assessments from people on the ground, providing a way to keep informed 
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as the relief operation unfolds. The social media of the future may not be the same social media 
we know today, but some form of it will exist and will be a valuable communication tool for the 
HA/DR tasks. The internet provides a worldwide availability of communications and these 
applications that reside on the internet provided the perfect collaborative environment where a 
wide range of internal and external partners can work together. 
Knowing the partners that are going to participate in a relief operation helps to know the 
type of data they use and the format they use it. Unfortunately, no two HA/DR events are alike 
and many times the partners are different. However, there is a core of partners that is almost 
always involved if the U.S. military is involved, such as USAID and U.S. State Department, and 
the International Red Cross, United Nations Organizations. The more these organizations can 
practice information sharing in Phase 0, the Prepare Phase, the smoother the operation becomes 
because the information and the format it is in will be known and processes and procedures to 
use this information can be developed and exercised ahead of the disaster response. 
Comparing partners in Table 7.2, during the Haiti relief effort there were fewer military 
organizations and international entities. However, there were more external partners and relief 
organizations, some of them including volunteers who were using social media and web-based 
mapping capability which they would provide to first responders for their use. 
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Table 7.3 Partners in Relief Operations 
U.S. military 
Partners 
Indian Ocean Tsunami Haiti Earthquake JLLIS 
Military Units-
Domestic 
U.S. Pacific Command 
and Third Marine 
Expeditionary Force III 
MEF (Okinawa)  
U.S. Southern 
Command, United 
States Coast Guard 
Countries with a 
working relationship 
with U.S. military 
Military Units- 
Other Countries 
Australia, Brunei, France, 
Germany, Japan, South 






States, United Kingdom 
Brazil, China, Spain, 
France, South Korea, 
Cuba, Iceland, 
Canada, United 





State Department, OFDA, 
U.S. Embassy 
State Department, 
OFDA, Department of 
Homeland Security, 
FEMA, Department of 
Health and Human 




UN OCHA, United 
Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), The World 
Health Organization 
(WHO), World Food 
Program, (WFP),  
UN OCHA International 
Organizations that 















International Federation of 
the Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, Red 
Cross, Medicins Sans 
Frontiers/ Doctors Without 
Borders, Save the 
Children, (109 NGOs 
would provide assistance) 
Oxfam, International 
Committee of the Red 
Cross, Food for the 
Poor, Mercy & 

















Residents with cell phones Residents with cell 
phones 
Diverse individuals 
or groups of 
individuals 
 
Theoretical Fit and Recommended Enhancements 
With all these dimensions taken into consideration, the adapted Task-Technology Fit 
Framework was ideal for the examination of two historic disaster relief case studies along with 
the lessons learned in other humanitarian assistance/disaster relief events. This research found 
that the theory has application for virtual organizations provided it incorporates the presence of 
data sharing partners. To do this, the theory would need to differentiate between internal and 
external data sharing partners. When partners are present, the Assess and Execute tasks rely on 
both structured as well as unstructured data, in large part due to advances in technology 
platforms that favor one over the other. One could easily argue that corporations have at least as 
good, or not better, access to emergent technology would benefit from the same advances in data 
sharing capabilities, especially in the transmission of real time data that is needed by multiple 
partners/organizations. In addition, as high-visibility security breaches in the corporate world 
suggest (i.e., Google, Yahoo, eBay, Equifax and FaceBook), security concerns related to vetting 
who has access to data in the corporate sector parallel those of the U.S. military. Therefore, the 
adapted TTF model is suggestive of changes that could be made to the original TTF model. 
Basing the analysis on just two cases will limit the generalizability of the findings. 
However, the study begins exploration of a gap in the task-technology fit literature to determine 
its portability from a single organization and routine tasks to an episodic virtual organization 
with expected and unexpected actors who play different roles during the phases of the relief 
efforts. For an exploratory endeavor such as this, sacrificing precision in results that can be 
obtained when analyzing a high number of cases in order to provide a richer understanding of the 
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cases is a reasonable tradeoff. Small-n comparative case analysis allows for close examination of 
contextual nuances and identification of future concepts that can be included in future research 
that will be able to better overcome the threats to the external validity of the research results. 
Even though I argue that the theory can be enhanced to be portable to multi-organization 
collaborations, there are some threats to validity of the research design that could not be 
completely mitigated that cause me to be more circumspect in my claims. 
For example, the selection of cases is purposeful since the author can provide first-person 
validation of the secondary source data. However, both the data as well as the author’s 
recollection suffer from the threat associated with recalling but not re-interpreting historical 
events. As more and more time elapses, and as the world experiences more and more HA/DR 
events and relief efforts, there is potential for the events to be interpreted differently today than 
they would have been at the moment they occurred. The analysis relied heavily on triangulation 
of the findings to mitigate this threat to internal validity. Adaptation of the theory needs to be 
tested with corporate sector organizations to determine the generalizability of these cases that 
primarily reflect U.S. military actions. Future academic research needs to verify proposed 
enhancements to theory and to overcome threats to validity that could not be controlled. 
To test and extend the findings of this study, researchers interview various internal and 
external partners that have played key roles in a recent multinational HA/DR effort that included 
the military component. The individual(s) from these organizations should be in a role where 
information sharing was critical to the completion of their tasking and which contributed to the 
coordination and success of the relief effort. The following are some examples: 
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• Military staff members, foreign and domestic. These should be individuals from the task 
force, whether joint or combined, and/or from staffs that interfaced with the task force. 
These members can also address the specific task they performed. 
• USAID and the State Department. They can confirm how well government and 
interagency partners exchanged information and what format and confirm the fit with the 
adapted TTF theory. A special look and the use of the MITAMs and the exchange of 
information with the Humanitarian Operations Center would help confirm this.  They 
may also be able to address other interagency partners. If not, more interviews can be 
conducted as appropriate. 
• United Nations. This representative would be from the individuals imbedded in the task 
force and who they a key role as a UN representative or liaison. 
• International Red Cross and other IOs and NGO. I specifically mentioned the 
International Red Cross not only because they are world-wide and are often involved in 
international responses, but they were interviewed after the Indian Ocean Tsunami and 
that interview was captured in JLLIS.  Other members of organizations should be picked 
based on the extent of their involvement.  
• APAN staff. I would also interview a member of the APAN staff. They provide an 
unclassified environment outside the U.S. military domain in which traditional and non-
traditional partners can exchange information, plan and coordinate. I would probably 
select a knowledge manager as they would have the best pulse on what is being exchange 
and how it is being exchanged. 
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Research Summary and Practical Implications 
Even with all the training exercises, planning and preparation, that are done to prepare for 
natural and man-made disasters, no two disasters are the same. This conclusion is a mantra 
perpetuated among relief organizations who respond to natural and man-made disasters every 
day. But, prepare they must; despite the differences in the HA/DR event that requires a response. 
There are many things that are common between disasters and many lessons learned. The 
preparation is shaped by these lessons learned. Close examination of these prior events is 
extremely useful in helping organizations to prepare for a wide range of disasters ranging from 
small localized events such as the Nepal earthquake or Philippine mudslides, to once in a 
lifetime, geographically-dispersed events, such as the earthquake off the coast of Sumatra that 
resulted in a tsunami that impacted a region that covered three continents. 
The findings from the three substantive empirical chapters reveal that the cases of the two 
HA/DR events, as well as the JLLIS lessons learned contributions, have a lot in common. For 
example, there are a lot of the same participants even though the HA/DR events or exercises 
occurred in different parts of the world. Some other generalizations that can be made about the 
participants in HA/DR preparation and on the ground response activities are that: 
• There is worldwide support from public, private and non-governmental organizations 
from around the world,  
• Relief support typically comes from the U.S. military along with other foreign militaries 
• HA/DR events test the responders’ ability to work together and share information, and 
• Technology used to share information can be based on platforms that support the sharing 
of structured and/or unstructured data. However, the trend over 20+ years of case data is toward 
structured data sharing with internal partners and unstructured data with external partners. As the 
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data analyzed in this study demonstrate, both internal and external partners are engaged with the 
U.S. military to different extents during certain phases of the HA/DR event; because of this, 
there is a parallel reliance on a mix of structured and unstructured data. 
In a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief event, the key to providing relief and comfort 
to the victims is that it is done with speed and efficiency, which in many times exceeds the 
resources and capabilities of the impacted nation. The urgency to act is constant whether the 
disaster is small or massive across multiple continents. However, if it is a large-scale 
multinational response effort, the effort becomes more complex. These kinds of events have 
many and varied actors, each of whom offer unique resources and capabilities. The matching of 
data types for information sharing that support coordination between a quickly assembled group 
of internal and external partners is the biggest practical implication from this research. 
A 1992 study by Wong concluded that organizations perform better when they work 
together in a cohesive environment. Sharing information internally and externally among the 
organizations is expected to improve group cohesion and as a result improve the performance of 
the organization. Based on this logic/premise, how information is shared becomes important 
because of the diversity of the actors and the established networks in which they work. As long 
as the information exchange and collaboration stay at the unclassified level, then the commercial 
internet and other technology platforms are beneficial for sharing unstructured data and can be 
used as the common denominator for that purpose. 
The practical applications of this researcher will benefit organizations asked to participate 
in these types of relief efforts. The results provide insight into contextual variables that the 
various functional organizations can determine the type of data to use for the task they must 
perform. For example, the National Guard has an initiative involving information sharing among 
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the states when they have to work together called Shared Situational Awareness. This 
information is not only shared between state-level National Guard units it is also shared between 
interagency partners, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency and Department of 
Homeland Security. These are all traditional or internal partners. The National Guard is moving a 
lot of their applications to the cloud to support relief missions. The Joint Information Exchange 
Environment (JIEE) is used to exchange information in order to meet domestic operations. The 
operations and logistics directorates are requesting that, as a part of the modernization of JIEE, 
applications, they also develop data systems that have more structure, so they can better monitor 
and manage their requests for assistance and better for logistics tracking. This fits very well with 
the adapted TTF model that I have developed in this research. 
APAN has already moved all their applications to the cloud to include an ArcGIS server 
to provide detailed mapping products for the generation of a common operational picture and 
other geo-spatial products. This provides an excellent model for the National Guard to follow. 
APAN customers are more diverse then those of the National Guard and therefore tend to have 
more unstructured information, although it handles both very well. It too seems to fit well with 
the adapted TTF model  
Both structured and unstructured data play a significant role in an HA/DR and both are 
needed. For example, an unstructured report from the area of operation may indicate a reduced 
capability at a hospital especially in a situation where the natural disaster left a wing of that 
hospital unusable. If there is a database or spreadsheet of the hospitals capabilities it can be 
modified with inputs provided by the unstructured data.  
The blending of these types of data will become more common place as developers and 
relief organizations work together and learn how more how these different data types can 
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supplement and enhance their value. APAN is already using blogs to inject events into exercises 
taken from a master scenario event list. This learning curve can be enhanced by continually 
engaging with traditional and non-traditional partners and developing new and better ways on 
how diverse organizations are going to work together. 
When APAN was first stood up in early 2000, the organization consisted of a technical 
staff (developers, integrators, systems engineers and administrators, etc.), analysts (regional 
subject matter experts, country former desk officers, former foreign affairs officers), and liaisons 
from other partner organizations including the Center of Excellence and the Pacific Disaster 
Center. The APAN staff today operates as primarily a technical staff.  However, the engagement 
with these other organizations continues, especially during exercise planning and execution as 
well as disaster related conferences. Re-visiting the organization liaison from partner 
organizations would further enhance the ability to share information in the most effective ways 
and by leveraging the technologies and processes being developed and improved. This 
adaptation to the TTF model would also be value added also to the combatant commands around 
the global to address their unique requirements. 
Another practical implication from this study is that APAN is not the only system used 
during the U.S. military operations relative to HA/DR events. However, in practice a majority of 
the federal government’s focus is placed on this system because of its use by the military 
combined with a very broad base of use by internal partners. In the future, elements of the APAN 
system could be adapted and used by more external partners who are predictably involved with 
the U.S. military in HA/DR events. 
Determining the role of the information provider is critical to deciding when and how to 
share data. Practitioners should determine whether the information provided is necessary for any 
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or all phases of the disaster relief operation. Finally, it must be determined what applications are 
best used to share the information. Technologies that handle unstructured data are often social 
media and/or Web 2.0 technologies. While traditional databases, spreadsheets and other 
delimited information better handles structured data, each has distinct advantages, and both are 
necessary, for virtual partnerships formed in response to unplanned activities that must be 
provided by a virtual organization. This adaption of Zigurs and Buckland’s (1998) Task and 
Technology Fit framework improve guidance for the choice of technology platforms to leverage 
the availability of structured or unstructured data and improve task performance. 
Technology will continue to change. The use of drones will become more prevalent, not 
only to provide assessments but also to deliver critical items such as medical supplies. Drones, 
like social media, are becoming more and more available to the public at large which increases 
their availability and creates a larger community of capable pilots. The technology built into 
drones are becoming more sophisticated in their capabilities. There availability and affordability 
with a huge return on investments, makes these a good fit for providing rapid response and 
critical information capture. 
If one were to look forward 25 years from now, the end of technology advancements and 
the blending of structured and unstructured data and technology platforms are not likely. It is 
more reasonable to predict, the coming together or diverse organizations into a virtual 
organization to work toward a common goal for providing relief and assistance after a disaster.  
While the means will continue to change; technological reliance will remain. The challenge will 
be in the alignment of task and technology processes and procedures to best handle the activities 
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